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I. INTRODUCTION
Some twenty-plus years ago, I undertook an exploration of what I
called "The Law of the First Amendment."' My purpose in doing so was
to "analyze the First Amendment as it appears to judges and lawyers in
the context of actual litigation and to explicate the meaning of the "Law
of the First Amendment." 2 I did so from the perspective of a
constitutional law professor who had litigated a number of First
3Amendment cases over the years.
My litigation experience ha[d] carried over into my teaching
of the First Amendment and ha[d] led me to conclude that
lawyers and academic commentators tend to approach the First
Amendment with fundamentally different perspectives. This
1. Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment in Litigation: The "Law of the First
Amendment, " 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 457 (1991).
2. See id. at 457.
3. The results in earlier cases were mixed. Some cases resulted in reported opinions.
See Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973); Preston v. Cowan, 69 F. Supp. 14
(W.D. Ky. 1973); Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970); Black Unity League
of Ky. v. Miller, 394 U.S. 100 (1969) (per curiam); O'Leary v. Commonwealth, 441
S.W.2d 150 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 40 (1969); McSurely v.
Ratliff, 282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967). The cases litigated in the late 1980s and 1990s
generally resulted in success. Many of those resulted in reported opinions. See Planned
Parenthood Affiliates of Mich. v. Miller, 21 F. Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Dambrot
v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995); G&V Lounge v. Mich. Liquor
Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir. 1994); Lueth v. St. Clair Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 732
F. Supp. 1410 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich.
1989). 1 no longer engage in active constitutional litigation and instead limit my
involvement to a consulting role.
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difference in perspective is much more than a difference between
"doctrine" and "theory" or a difference between "what the
Constitution means" and "what the Constitution should mean." It
goes to the difference between how an academic commentator
may approach the First Amendment for purposes of academic
commentary and how litigating lawyers and judges, including
the Justices of the Supreme Court, do in fact analyze- a First
Amendment issue in the context of actual litigation.
.The academic commentator is subject to no constraints
whatsoever in establishing the analytical framework for
academic commentary. The academic commentator is free to
posit a grand theory about the meaning of the First Amendment
and to analyze the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions
with reference to the commentator's grand theory. Or in a more
modest enterprise, the academic commentator may develop a
thesis about the meaning of the First Amendment with respect to
a particular kind of expression and try to support the thesis by
invoking a number of conceptual, doctrinal, and policy
considerations.
In actual First Amendment litigation, however, both grand
theory and theses about the meaning of the First Amendment
with respect to a particular kind of expression are [usually]
irrelevant. Rather, in actual litigation, the analytical framework
for the resolution of the First Amendment issue is what I [have]
call [ed] the "Law of the First Amendment."A
"The 'Law of the First Amendment' is th[e] body of concepts,
principles, specific doctrines," and precedents in particular areas of First
Amendment activity5 that has emerged "from the collectivity of the
Supreme Court's decisions" in First Amendment cases over a long period
of time.6 In my earlier article, I endeavored to explain the "structure of
the 'Law of the First Amendment,' [to] discuss its essential components,
and to demonstrate how the 'Law of the First Amendment' controls the
4. Sedler, supra note 1, at 457-58.
5. In the original article, I referred to the body of precedents in particular areas of
First Amendment activity as "balancing/subsidiary doctrine." Id. at 458.
6. Id.
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results in actual First Amendment litigation, or at least sets the
parameters for the resolution of the First Amendment question at issue."7
In scholarly discussions regarding the First Amendment, it has long
been "commonplace to lament the failure of the Supreme Court to
develop any general theory of the First Amendment."8 Rather, it is said
7. Id. For the author's discussion and application of the "Law of the First
Amendment" to determine the constitutionality of governmental regulation of First
Amendment activity involving the use of private property, see Robert A. Sedler, The
Rehnquist Court and the First Amendment: Property and Speech, 21 WASH. U. J.L. &
PoL'Y 123, 138-39 (2006).
8. Sedler, supra note 1, at 458. See, e.g., THOMAS 1. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 16 (1970). "The outstanding fact about the First Amendment
today is that the Supreme Court has never developed any comprehensive theory of what
that constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases," and
its failure to do so "has had a most unfortunate effect upon the work of the lower Federal
and State Courts, upon the performance of government officials, and upon the
understanding of the public." Id. Professor Emerson said that the Supreme Court had the
responsibility of "building a comprehensible structure of doctrine and practice that is
meaningful to all and meets the needs of a free society." Id. at 15-16. Professor Emerson
went on to formulate a general theory of the First Amendment, distinguishing between
"expression," which would receive full protection, and "action," which the government
could regulate, so long as the regulation did not impair "expression." Id. In a
contemporary review of the book, which I called a "master work of scholarly
excellence," I questioned whether the "expression-action" formulation would be effective
in practice. Robert A. Sedler, Review, The First Amendment in Theory and Practice, 80
YALE L.J. 1070, 1070, 1076 (1970). 1 questioned, in particular, whether this formulation
would protect fully the dissent and social change function of the First Amendment. Id. at
1080. Writing at a time of a movement for sweeping social change and strong opposition
to the Vietnam War, I feared-incorrectly, as it turned out-that the courts would be
resistant to First Amendment claims in this context. Id. at 1072. 1 also incorrectly feared
that courts would often find the particular form of protest activity to constitute "action"
rather than "expression." Id. Instead, I proposed a formulation of "full protection with
limited exceptions." Id. at 1086-87.
Writing some years later in the context of urging substantial protection for
commercial speech, Professor Steven Shiffrin, referring to Emerson's book as "surely the
best book on the first amendment written in this century," said that "Emerson's attempt to
formulate a general theory of the first amendment, however, has not been successful."
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1212, 1283 (1983). Professor Shiffrin
went on to argue against any general theory of the First Amendment. Id. He stated as
follows:
Scholar after scholar has set out to produce a different but more successful
general theory. All of these attempts, in my judgment, have been thwarted by
the complexity of social reality. Speech interacts with the rest of our reality in
too many complicated ways to allow the hope or the expectation that a single
vision or a single theory could explain, or dictate helpful conclusions in, the
vast terrain of speech regulation. In trying to move toward general theory,
scholars have too often built abstractions without sufficient regard for the
diverse contexts in which speech regulation exists. I do not mean to imply that
[Vol. 58:10031006
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that the Court "has sought to develop principles on a case-by-case basis
and has produced a complex and conflicting body of constitutional
precedent."9
However, while the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions
in their collectivity may seem complex and confusing when
viewed from an academic perspective because of the absence of
a unifying general theory, the "Law of the First Amendment"
that has emerged from these decisions is neither complex nor
conflicting. The "Law of the First Amendment" also has resulted
our attempts in the past twenty years to move toward a general theory of the
first amendment have been unproductive. I do suggest, however, that in the
next twenty years we would be better off if we had more appreciation for the
advantages of thinking small. It is time to move away from a general theory of
the First Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason
and the First Amendment, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615 (1987). Farber and Frickey
challenged a number of "general theories" about the meaning of the First Amendment. Id.
at 1617-18. They concluded that, "[r]ather than thinking of free speech as one level in a
hierarchy of values, it may be better to think of it as part of a web of mutually reinforcing
values," so that First Amendment issues should be resolved by the exercise of "judicial
practical reason." Id. at 1640, 1652-53.
General theories continue to abound. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis & Joshua D.
Rosenberg, The Inherent Structure of Free Speech Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
131 (2010). Davis and Rosenberg "provide a framework that distills free speech law
down to three [propositions]." Id. at 131.
[F]irst, the Constitution constrains government if it regulates private speech,
but not if government speaks, sponsors speech or restricts expression in
managing an internal governmental function; second, government regulation is
subject to the Free Speech Clause only if it targets communication; and third,
government regulation targeting communication is constitutional if it survives a
constrained cost-benefit analysis.
Id.
I do not favor any general theory of the First Amendment, and I am pleased to see
that the Supreme Court has made no effort whatsoever to promulgate one. See Sedler,
supra note 1, at 458 ("[W]hile the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions in their
collectivity may seem complex and confusing when viewed from an academic
perspective because of the absence of a unifying general theory, the 'Law of the First
Amendment' . . . has resulted in a very high degree of constitutional protection for
freedom of expression in this nation."). Instead, as I have demonstrated earlier and will
continue to demonstrate in the present writing, the Court has resolved First Amendment
questions by the application of the "Law of the First Amendment." Id. at 484.
9. JESSE H. CHOPER, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., YALE KAMISAR & STEVEN H.
SHIFFMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES--COMMENTS-QUESTIONs 641 (11th ed.
2011).
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in a very high degree of constitutional protection for freedom of
expression in this Nation.' 0
In the present writing, I propose to revisit the "Law of the First
Amendment" in light of the Supreme Court's post-1991 decisions in First
Amendment cases. In this revisit, I will demonstrate that nothing has
changed in the intervening years and that the structure of the "Law of the
10. Sedler, supra note 1, at 458. It is now recognized that, with the possible exception
of freedom from racial discrimination, freedom of expression is "the strongest protection
afforded to any individual right in our constitutional system, and, in practice, a First
Amendment challenge is the one that is most likely to be successful." Id. at 458 n.3. To
take a few classic examples, "while a public school board or university can refuse to
renew the contract of a nontenured teacher on seemingly 'arbitrary' grounds, it cannot do
so on the ground that the teacher has engaged in activity that is protected by the First
Amendment, such as criticizing American foreign policy." Id. See, e.g., Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Similarly, government "regulation of economic
activity, which is virtually immune from constitutional challenge under the due process
or equal protection clause, becomes subject to serious constitutional challenge and
possible invalidation when the regulation reaches advertising, because advertising is
speech for First Amendment purposes and brings into play the commercial speech
doctrine." Sedler, supra note 1, at 458 n.3. See, e.g., Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S.
483 (1955); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1947). See also Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (holding that a
ban on promotional advertising by a regulated public utility, purportedly designed to
advance the government's interest in energy conservation, violates the First Amendment).
More significantly perhaps, it is also fair to say that the constitutional protection
afforded to freedom of expression in the United States is seemingly unparalleled in other
constitutional systems and that, in the United States, as a constitutional matter, the value
of freedom of expression generally prevails over other democratic values. See Sedler,
supra note 1, at 462-63. For example, while article 19 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights generally protects freedom of expression, article 20 requires
that "any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence" to be prohibited by law.
U.N. Office of the Comm'r for Human Rights, General Comment No. 11: Prohibition of
Propaganda for War and Inciting National, Racial or Religious Hatred (Art. 20) (July 29,
1983), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/
CCPRGeneralCommentNo I1 .pdf.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/60dcfa23f32d3feac I 2563ed00
491355?Opendocument. War propaganda and "hate speech" are, in most circumstances,
protected by the First Amendment, so when the United States Senate ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the resolution of ratification
contained a reservation to the effect that, "Art. 20 does not authorize or require legislation
or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and
association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States." U.S.
Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, 138 CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/civilres.html. As to the unparalleled protection of
freedom of expression in the United States, see generally Robert A. Sedler, Essay on
Freedom of Speech: The United States Versus the Rest of the World, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 377 (2006).
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First Amendment" is exactly the same as it was when I first explored it
over twenty years ago." I will incorporate all of the post-1991 cases into
the principles, specific doctrines, and precedents in particular areas of
First Amendment activity that I developed in my original analysis of the
"Law of the First Amendment." 2 In addition, I will expand on the
precedents in particular areas of First Amendment activity to include
areas of First Amendment activity that were not discussed in the original
article.13
I will begin by making some general observations about First
Amendment analysis, including a bit of First Amendment theory
reflected in the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions.14 In so
doing, I will point out that in its post-1991 decisions, the Court has
increased the protection afforded to First Amendment rights and has
resisted attempts to diminish that protection.'5 I will then review all the
components of the "Law of the First Amendment," adding the Court's
post-1991 decisions to its pre-1991 decisions.' 6 I will conclude this
revisit with a strong justification for the high degree of constitutional
protection for freedom of expression in the United States that is provided
under the "Law of the First Amendment." 7
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. Freedom of Expression for First Amendment Purposes
The first step in understanding First Amendment analysis is to
recognize that not all activity, which somehow involves speech or
writing, constitutes freedom of expression for First Amendment
purposes.' 8 First Amendment analysis, by which I mean an analysis
under the "Law of the First Amendment," does not apply to certain
categories of activity that involve speech or writing. These categories are
11. See discussion infra Parts II, III.
12. See discussion infra Parts II, Ill.
13. See discussion infra Part III.E.
14. See discussion infra Part II.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. See discussion infra Part III.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.
18. See Brian B. Mahoney, Constitutional Law-Speech Restriction, Governmental
Interests, and an Ordinance's Constitutionality-Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of
New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 569,
571 (2002).
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(1) unlawful verbal acts, (2) obscenity, (3) child pornography, and (4)
government speech.' 9
1. Unlawfil Verbal Acts
The fact that certain crimes such as perjury, bribery, or illegal
solicitation are carried out by means of words does not make them any
less criminal, and the punishment of these crimes is in no way
constrained by the First Amendment.20 As the Supreme Court has stated:
"it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press
to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in
part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language." 21 In other
words, conduct that the government may otherwise make unlawful does
not cease to be unlawful merely because it is carried out by means of
speech or writing.22 We will use the term "unlawful verbal acts" to refer
to such conduct.
In addition to crimes such as perjury, bribery, and illegal solicitation,
unlawful verbal acts include acts of discrimination that are carried out by
means of speech or writing, such as a newspaper carrying sex-designated
"help-wanted" advertisements2 3 or an employer sexually harassing an
employee by threatening to discharge her if she does not submit to his
19. See infra pp. 1009-17.
20. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
21. Id. In the recent case of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705
(2010), the Court held that the federal law making it a crime to "knowingly provid[e]
material support or resources to a 'foreign terrorist organization,"' 18 USC § 2339B,
prohibited a group from providing educational programs and political advocacy services
designed to persuade such an organization to pursue its aims through peaceful means, and
that such a prohibition did not violate the group's First Amendment rights.
22. Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498.
23. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973). A newspaper's carrying of sex-designated help-wanted advertisements
amounts to an act of sex discrimination and so is not protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 388-89, 391. Likewise, an advertisement for an illegal activity is not protected
expression for First Amendment purposes. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). In addition, the state may maintain fraud
actions against fundraisers hired by charitable organizations that make false or
misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how their donations will be
used. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 606 (2003).
See also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 479 (1993) (holding that the First
Amendment does not preclude a state from imposing additional punishment for an assault
that was racially motivated, where the basis for the imposition of additional punishment
is not the actor's beliefs, but the actor's discriminatory conduct taken pursuant to those
beliefs, the expression of which may be taken as evidence of the actor's racial
motivation).
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sexual advances.24 Again, what is being prohibited here is an act of
discrimination, and it is irrelevant for constitutional purposes how the act
of discrimination is being carried out. 25 The Court has also held that
"'fighting words" addressed by one person to another are not protected
by the First Amendment, because they are "likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace."26 Another
example of an unlawful verbal act is the classic "false cry of fire in a
crowded theater." 27 The false cry of fire in a crowded theater is not
protected expression for First Amendment purposes because the speaker
is not trying to convey an idea.28 Instead, the speaker is trying to induce
panic as an automatic response to the false cry of fire, and the
government may constitutionally prohibit a person from trying to induce
panic in this manner.29
24. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992).
25. See Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.
26. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942). "Fighting words" for
thcse purposes appear to be limited to one-to-one insults uttered in such circumstances as
to amount to an invitation to a fight. Id. at 571-72. The Court has resisted any effort to
expand the notion of "fighting words" to include highly offensive speech designed to
cause emotional distress to the recipient. Id. at 572. It has also held that the content
neutrality principle applies to any governmental prohibition of "fighting words" and so
has held unconstitutional a law that prohibited only "fighting words" that expressed a
message of racial hatred. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). The Court
has not, since Chaplinsky, held a law constitutional on the ground that it only prohibited
"fighting words."
Closely related to "fighting words" is a "true threat" in which the speaker uses words or
symbols making clear the speaker's intention to cause harm to another person. See
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 343 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705
(1969)). In Black, the Court held that the state could constitutionally prohibit the burning
of a cross "with the intent to intimidate a person or group." Id. The Court's conclusion
that the state could prohibit cross-burning with intent to intimidate as a "true threat" was
based in part on "cross burning's long and pernicious history as a signal of impending
violence." Id. at 344. The Court, however, also held that the First Amendment precluded
the state from making cross-burning prima facie evidence of intent to discriminate,
because this provision could result in a conviction for cross-burning without proof of
intent to discriminate. Id. at 364. This result could have a chilling effect on cross-burning
without the intent to discriminate, which is constitutionally protected. Id. at 366-67.
27. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
28. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969). See also Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988).
29. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 456. Contrast the situation in which there is in fact a
fire in a multistoried building, and someone says: "Ignore the 'in case of fire, take the
stairs' signs. Let's take the elevator, or we'll all be burned to death." Here, the speaker is
expressing an idea. The speaker is invoking the listener's cognition and is trying to
persuade the listener to take certain action. The idea that the speaker is expressing may be
an unsound idea, but, unlike the "false cry of fire in a crowded theater," it is an idea and
not an unlawful verbal act. Thus, it involves freedom of expression for First Amendment
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However, the concept of unprotected "verbal act" may be applied
only to activity that is otherwise unlawful and does not involve the
expression of an idea or the discussion of matters of public interest.30 The
government may not avoid the constraints of the First Amendment
simply by making the expression of a particular idea or the discussion of
particular matters of public interest "unlawful" because of the purported
harm that such expression or discussion is deemed to cause to individuals
or to the public at large. 3 1 For example, material contained in a book or
newspaper article may injure a person's reputation or privacy, or may
cause a person to suffer emotional distress, and the government may seek
to redress that injury by the imposition of tort liability, such as in an
action for defamation, invasion of privacy, or the intentional infliction of
emotional distress.32 But the injury that the government seeks to redress
by the imposition of tort liability has resulted from the expression of an
idea or the discussion of matters of public interest. 33 This being so, the
concept of unlawful "verbal act" cannot be invoked to take the
purportedly harmful expression out of the protection of the First
Amendment, and the government's imposition of tort liability for the
harm caused by the expression must be justified under the "Law of the
First Amendment." 34
purposes, and any governmental effort to sanction it must be justified under the "Law of
the First Amendment." It may be assumed that the government can justify the sanction on
the ground that the expression creates an imminent danger of immediate and serious
harm, akin to that created by advocacy of unlawful action "likely to incite or produce
imminent lawless action." See id.
30. Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Lows, Illegal Courses
of Conduct, "Situation-Altering Utterances," and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L.
REV. 1277, 1315 (2005).
31. Id. at 1310-11.
32. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46-47.
33. See id. at 50.
34. Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional low, 48 WAYNE
L. REV. 173, 287 (2002). See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 46 (explaining that the
First Amendment precludes a state from imposing liability for emotional distress suffered
by a public figure who was the subject of an offensive parody). See discussion infra notes
252-58, on the New York Times rule, which imposes significant First Amendment
limitations on the ability of the state to impose liability for defamation, invasion of
privacy, and the infliction of emotional distress. Under the New York Times rule, when a
public official or public figure is involved, the state may only impose liability for false
statements of fact that were knowingly false or made with reckless disregard for truth or
falsity. See Volokh, supra note 30, at 1277. Volokh emphasizes that the notion of what I
refer to as an unlawful verbal act must be limited to what are clearly "unprotected
categories and must not trench on what is otherwise protected speech by labeling it as
'conduct."' Id. at 1310-11.
1012 [Vol. 58:1003
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2. Obscenity
Pornography, in the sense of the depiction or description of sexual
activity in books, magazines, motion pictures, television, on the Internet,
and the like, is fully protected by the First Amendment, and the
government cannot prohibit pornographic expression on the ground that
it is considered to be "immoral" or "degrading to women."35 However,
the Supreme Court has carved out an "obscenity" exception to the
constitutional protection otherwise afforded to pornographic
36
expression. In an unusual "historical context" interpretation of the First
Amendment, the Court has held that the Framers of the First Amendment
did not intend to include obscenity within its protections, because they
considered obscenity to be "utterly without redeeming social
importance."37 Obscenity for these purposes is very narrowly defined,
and the constitutional test for "obscenity" makes it clear that serious
books, motion pictures, and other works describing and depicting sexual
activity, even in a very graphic way, are fully protected by the First
Amendment.39
35. See, e.g., Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 115-16 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional a prohibition on indecent commercial telephone messages); Am.
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001
(1986) (explaining an ordinance's definition of "pornography" as simply the "graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women").
36. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,483 (1957).
37. Id. at 484.
38. A work is "obscene" for First Amendment purposes only if, taken as a whole: (1)
the dominant theme of the work appeals to a "prurient" interest in sex; (2) it is patently
offensive to contemporary community standards relating to the description or depiction
of sexual activity; and (3) it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). "Obscenity" is thus limited to "hard core"
books, motion pictures, and videocassettes that contain nothing more than graphic
description or depiction of sexual activity without any real story line and that are
typically purveyed in "adult bookstores" and other "adult establishments." Id. at 36.
"Anti-obscenity" laws must very precisely define the sexual activity that cannot be
described or depicted, and any law that fails to do so or that goes beyond the Court's
definition of "obscenity" in Miller will be found to be void on its face for overbreadth. Id.
at 41. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text. "Obscenity" is limited to depictions
of sexual conduct. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court rejected the state's efforts to liken
violence to obscenity and found a state law prohibiting the sale or rental of violent video
games to minors violative of the First Amendment. Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n,
131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). The Court observed, "Our cases have been clear that the
obscenity exception to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds
shocking, but only depictions of 'sexual conduct."' Id. See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Sex,
Violence and the First Amendment, 74 U. CI. L. REV. 1857, 1857-58 (2007).
39. Nudity, of course, is not synonymous with obscenity, and the fact that performers
appear in the nude on stage or in motion pictures does not deprive the performance of
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Since the First Amendment does not protect obscenity, the
government may constitutionally prohibit the dissemination of obscenity
to persons wishing to receive it" and may obtain an injunction against
such dissemination. 4 1 However, in order to prevent a chilling effect on
the dissemination of constitutionally protected pornography resulting
from the government's efforts to suppress constitutionally unprotected
obscenity, the First Amendment requires that the government establish
procedures that will minimize this possible chilling effect and ensure that
there will be no actual suppression of constitutionally protected
42pornography. The most significant constitutionally required procedure
is that there can be no advance prohibition of the dissemination of a work
alleged to be obscene until there has been a judicial determination of
obscenity in an adversary proceeding initiated by the government. 43
3. Child Pornography
Child pornography refers to the participation of children in the
depiction of sexual activity, such as in photographs, movies, videos, or
on the Internet.4 As the government can conclude that the participation
of children in the depiction of sexual activity causes serious harm to the
children forced to participate in that activity, the government's interest in
preventing such harm "constitutes a government[al] objective of
surpassing importance."a For this reason, the Court has held that child
pornography does not constitute freedom of expression for First
First Amendment protection. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).
Nude dancing, even of the striptease variety, also involves freedom of expression for
First Amendment purposes, since it conveys the idea of sexuality. Id. at 566. However,
the Court has upheld a ban on totally nude dancing in "adult entertainment"
establishments on the ground that the state may find that there are harmful "secondary
effects" associated with totally nude dancing in this kind of establishment, such as a
higher incidence of sexual assault and prostitution. Id. at 582.
40. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973). The government
may not, however, make it a criminal offense for an individual to read or view
"obscenity" in the privacy of the individual's home. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
568 (1969).
41. See, e.g., Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957). In practice,
there is relatively little enforcement of anti-obscenity laws. See supra note 38. See infra
note 177 and accompanying text. The focus instead has been on the containment of the
"commercial sex" industry, including regulation of the location of "adult entertainment"
establishments and the activity conducted at such establishments. See supra note 39. See
infra note 177 and accompanying text.
42. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965).
43. See id. at 58.
44. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (West 2008).
45. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
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Amendment purposes and that the government may prohibit the
dissemination of all child pornography without regard to whether the
work itself is legally obscene."6 However, because the unprotected nature
of child pornography is based on the harm it causes to children, the
government may not constitutionally prohibit the depiction of children
engaging in sexual activity that does not involve actual children, such as
the use of adults who look like children or virtual child pornography
involving the use of computer-generated images of children engaging in
sexual activity.47
4. Government Speech
The First Amendment does not apply to the government's own
speech.48 When the government chooses to speak, it may convey only the
message that the government wants to convey, and in no respect is
conveyance of that message subject to the "Law of the First
Amendment." 4 9 Thus, the government may use its funds or public
property to convey its message.50 For example, since the display of
donated monuments in a city-owned park is a form of government
speech, a city could choose to accept a monument donated by one group
and reject a monument donated by another group.1 So too, the First
Amendment permits the government to impose conditions on the
recipients of government funds or benefits that are related to the
advancement of governmental policy objectives.5 2 Thus, because federal
law prohibits the use of federal funds to subsidize abortions, the
government may require that recipients of federal funds for family
planning purposes not provide counseling concerning the use of abortion
as a means of family planning nor make referrals to abortion providers.53
The government may also set advisory guidelines relating to the content
46. Id. at 761.
47. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal. 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). However, offers to
provide or requests to obtain child pornography are types of unlawful verbal acts and are
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection even if the material is not
actually child pornography. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 299 (2008). The
depiction of the children must be sexual in nature. Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576,
582-83 (1989). The depiction of ordinary nudity of children, such as a photograph of
small children taking a bath or a topless teenager on a beach, does not constitute child
pornography and is protected under the First Amendment. See id. at 585.
48. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 467-68.
51. Id. at 464.
52. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1991).
53. Id.
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of artistic programs that the government is funding, such as a guideline
that the funding agency take into account "general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public." 54
And, most recently, the Court has held that a public university's policy
requiring officially recognized student groups to open their membership
and leadership positions to all students, including those who do not share
the groups' core beliefs about religion and sexual orientation, does not
violate the groups' First Amendment rights.
Related to the proposition that the First Amendment does not apply
to the government's own speech is the proposition that generally the
public has no First Amendment right of access to information possessed
by the government.5 6 Thus, as a constitutional matter, the government
may refuse to release information within its control and may deny access
to certain governmental facilities.57 The Court has held, however, that the
54. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998). In United
States v. American Library Association, 539 U.S. 194 (2003), the Court upheld on its face
a provision of the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), requiring public libraries
receiving federal assistance to install software filters to block obscene or pornographic
images and to prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them.
20 U.S.C.A. § 9101 (West 2000). The law permitted disabling the filters for "other lawful
purposes," and the filter programs at issue permitted disabling during use by an adult.
Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 201.
55. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010). For an interesting discussion of the different
capacities in which the government speaks and the view that in some circumstances,
government speech may impair private speech rights or violate assumptions underlying
the First Amendment itself, see Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many
Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REv. 1377 (2001). The Court's decisions,
however, have not drawn a distinction between different categories of government speech
and have given the government broad leeway to convey whatever message the
government wants to convey. Id. at 1431.
56. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978). As the media has no
greater First Amendment rights than those enjoyed by the public at large, the media
likewise cannot claim a constitutional right of access to government-controlled
information. Id. at I1.
57. Id. at 15-16. The cases establishing this proposition have involved unsuccessful
efforts by the media to obtain face-to-face interviews with prison inmates and to
challenge restrictions on media access to prisons. See id. at 15; Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 819 (1974). In the context of holding that the media had no First Amendment
right to face-to-face interviews with prison inmates or to challenge restrictions on media
access to prisons, the Court emphasized that the media or "working press" does not have
greater First Amendment rights than the public at large. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11. This
being so, members of the media do not have a First Amendment privilege to refuse to
testify in a legal proceeding or to avoid disclosure of confidential sources. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972). In reaction to this holding, many states, but not
Congress, have enacted "shield" laws, enabling members of the media in some
circumstances to refuse to disclose confidential sources. See generally State-by-State
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public does have a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials and
to all stages of the criminal process.ss
B. A Bit of First Amendment Theory: The Marketplace of Ideas
To the extent that the Supreme Court has developed any theory about
the meaning of the First Amendment, it is that the First Amendment
operates within the framework of a marketplace of ideas.5 9 Under this
theory, the primary function of the First Amendment is to ensure that all
ideas enter the marketplace of ideas and compete with one another,
seeking to win acceptance by the public as a wholei 0 This means that,
under the First Amendment, there can be no such thing as a false idea,
that the government cannot keep what it considers to be false ideas out of
the marketplace, and that if someone engages in what many of us would
consider "bad" speech, such as the espousal of racism6 1 or genocide, 62
then the remedy must be "more speech, not enforced silence." 63
Guide to the Reporter's Privilege for Student Media, STUDENT PRESs LAW CENTER
(2010), http://www.splc.org/knowyourrights/legalresearch.asp?id=60. The government
may also obtain a search warrant to search a newsroom under the same conditions as it
may obtain a warrant to conduct any other search. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S.
547, 552-53 (1978). In reaction to the Court's holding that there is no constitutional right
of access to governmentally-controlled information, in 1976, Congress enacted the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which provides, subject to nine very specific
exemptions, very broad access to information within the control of the executive branch
of the federal government. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (West 1995). The underlying premise of the
Act is that all records of federal agencies and all information within their control must be
available to the public unless specifically exempt from disclosure. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). A
companion law, the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, requires most government
agencies to open their meetings to the public, subject to exemptions that parallel most of
the FOIA exemptions. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b (West 1995). Most states have also adopted
freedom of information and "open meetings" acts with similar provisions. See, e.g.,
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.261 (West 2012).
58. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. I (1986); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980).
59. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
60. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
62. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
63. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). As
Justice Lewis Powell stated, "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974). Similarly, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated
more recently:
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes first developed the theory of the
marketplace of ideas in his classic dissent in Abrams v. United States,6 a
World War I case in which the Court majority upheld the conviction of
protestors for distributing leaflets expressing opposition to the war.65
Justice Holmes stated:
The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true. This is the ordinary
course in a free society. The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the
uninformed, the enlightened; to the straightout lie, the simple truth. The First
Amendment itself ensures the right to respond to speech we do not like, and for
good reason. Freedom of speech and thought flows not from the beneficence of
the state but from the inalienable rights of the person. And suppression of
speech by the government can make exposure of falsity more difficult, not less
so. Society has the right and civic duty to engage in open, dynamic, rational
discourse. These ends are not well served when the government seeks to
orchestrate public discussion through content-based mandates.
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549 (2012) (plurality opinion) (citation
omitted). In this case, the Court held 6-3 that the Stolen Valor Act, making it a crime to
falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals, violated the First Amendment. Id.
at 2543 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 704 (West 2012)). There is no doubt that the underlying
assumption of the marketplace of ideas theory is that in the final analysis, people are
capable of making rational judgments about which ideas are "false" and which ideas are
not "true," or at least not clearly "false." Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody's Fool: The
Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 799, 901 (2010). In an
interesting article applying behavioral economics to the underlying assumption of the
"rational audience," Professor Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky maintains that the "rationality
ideal" is "inevitably flawed" and that "[b]ehavioral economics helps illuminate areas in
which human beings tend to make cognitive mistakes." Id. at 849. Lidsky then concludes
that the rational audience assumption should not be discarded from First Amendment
doctrine, because "[a] presumption of audience irrationality would justify increased
government regulation of the speech marketplace, which presents far more dangers of
mischief than increased regulation of economic markets." Id. She states as follows:
If we the people are incapable of rationally choosing our collective fates, then
democracy is doomed to failure . . . . The rational audience ideal reflects a
justifiable distrust of overtly paternalistic intervention by government in the
realm of speech and expression. In light of the government's already powerful
potential to drown out other speakers in the marketplace of ideas, it is useful to
preserve the rational audience assumption as an additional check on
government's abuse of that power.
Id. at 850.
64. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
65. Id. at 624-31 (Holmes, J., dissenting). The defendants were convicted under the
Espionage Act, 40 Stat. 553, for conspiring to "utter, print, write and publish ... disloyal,
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of government of the United States,"
"language intended to bring the form of government of the United States into contempt,
scorn, contumely and dispute," "language intended to incite, provoke and encourage
resistance to the United States in said war," and language "to urge, incite and advocate
curtailment of production of things and products . . . necessary and essential to the
prosecution of the war." Id. at 616-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or
that you do not care whole heartedly for the result, or that you
doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution.
In a more recent emanation, the theory of the marketplace of ideas was
very effectively set forth by Justice John Marshall Harlan, writing for the
Court in Cohen v. California.6 7 Justice Harlan stated:
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be
voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use
of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry
and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice
upon which our political system rests.68
66. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In that case, the Court held that the First Amendment
protected the right to protest against the Vietnam War by the use of an "unseemly
expletive," here, wearing a jacket in public with the message, "Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16,
23, 26. For a discussion of Justice Harlan's evolving views on the meaning of the First
Amendment, as reflected in the Cohen opinion, and praise for his "commitment to the
protection of first amendment values and his rejection, at least by the end of his tenure on
the Court, of ad hoc balancing as a general approach to first amendment issues," see
Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Justice Harlan and the First Amendment, 2 CONsT.
COMMENT. 425, 453-54 (1985).
68. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
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In a number of other cases, the Court has also referred to the
marketplace of ideas, thus firmly establishing the theory of the
marketplace of ideas in First Amendment analysis.69
69. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2550 (2012) (citing Abrams,
250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S.
196, 208 (2008) (holding that a state election law providing for the selection of judicial
candidates did not violate the First Amendment, which "creates an open marketplace
where ideas . . . may compete without government interference") (citing Abrams, 250
U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
342 (1995) (invalidating a ban on anonymous campaign literature because "having
anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably outweighs any public
interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry"). In Alvarez, the Court invalidated
the Stolen Valor Act, which made it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military
decorations or medals. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551-52 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b)(c)
(West 2012)). The plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy stated, "The theory of our
Constitution is 'that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market."' Id. at 2550 (quoting Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
In Alvarez, the Court held unconstitutional a law that prohibited a false statement of
fact rather than a law that prohibited the expression of an idea. Id. at 2552-53. The theory
of the marketplace of ideas clearly has also resulted in First Amendment protection for a
large number of false statements of fact. Id. at 2544-47. To this extent, in our
constitutional system, we rely on the ability of the public to determine the truth of facts as
well as the truth of ideas. See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57
UCLA L. REV. 897, 907-912 (2010). In this article, Professor Schauer discusses what he
calls the "widespread public acceptance of factual falsity" and concludes that "[far more
than First Amendment freedoms have created a society in which truth seems to matter so
little, and far more than First Amendment freedoms will be necessary to do anything
about it." Id. at 919. Professor Rodney A. Smolla has suggested that it is possible to
conceptualize the history of the American free speech debate as a contest between two
alternative approaches to free speech regulation: one that seeks to identify and proscribe
inherently dangerous speech, see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(defining "fighting words" as "[w]ords which by their very utterance tend to inflict
injury"), and one that is based on the premise that "all speech is presumptively free
speech, and that it is to remain unshackled by government unless the government comes
forward with compelling justifications for its abridgments," as reflected in the
marketplace of ideas theory. Rodney A. Smolla, Words Which by Their Very Utterance
Inflict Injury: The Evolving Treatment of Inherently Dangerous Speech in Free Speech
Law and Theory, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 317, 357 (2009). He then says that there has been a
"paradigm shift taking place over the last several decades" and that today the marketplace
theory is the dominant one, concluding, "The overall effect of this shifting paradigm is to
broaden protection of freedom of speech, at the expense of other societal and individual
interests." Id. at 359-60.
It has been contended that "digital technologies [have] alter[ed] the social
conditions of speech and therefore should change the focus of free speech theory" from a
concern with protecting the democratic process to a larger concern with protecting and
promoting a democratic culture "in which individuals have a fair opportunity to
participate in the forms of meaning-making that constitute themselves as individuals."
Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2004). At this point in
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The theory of the marketplace of ideas is the foundation of the most
important First Amendment principle, that of content neutrality.70 As we
will see, under this principle, the government may not proscribe any
expression because of its content, and an otherwise valid regulation
violates the First Amendment if it differentiates between types of
expression because of content.7 1 This means, as I have stated, that under
the First Amendment, there can be no such thing as a "bad idea," that all
ideas, "good and bad," must be able to compete in the marketplace of
ideas, and that the remedy for what most of us would consider "bad
speech" is necessarily "more speech, not enforced silence." 72 It is the
content neutrality principle, derived from the theory of the marketplace
of ideas that, as a constitutional matter, sets the United States apart from
most other democratic nations, where "bad ideas," such as genocide and
racism, are not constitutionally protected and are proscribed by
73international human rights norms.
Operationally, the theory of the marketplace of ideas means only that
all ideas are entitled to enter the marketplace and to compete with other
ideas. 74 There is a built-in inequality in this theory, as it does not permit
the government to regulate the marketplace to ensure that every idea can
compete fairly with every other idea. Things being what they are, the
media and wealth interests obviously will have much bigger "stalls in the
marketplace" than the lone blogger or groups with limited resources.
However, the history of the First Amendment has been one of dissident
groups seeking access to the marketplace of ideas, so that they can
express their ideas with whatever resources they may have.7 5 Therefore,
the marketplace of ideas is designed to ensure access, not equality of
access, and governmental efforts to regulate the marketplace in order to
time, there is no indication that the Supreme Court is doing anything other than applying
the "Law of the First Amendment" to determine the constitutionality of governmental
regulation of the Internet. See infra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
70. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537.
71. Id.
72. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974).
73. See generally Sedler, supra note 10. See also Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in
Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOzo L. REv. 1523, 1529-
41 (2003), for a critical view of the content neutrality principle and the resulting
protection of hate speech in the United States as distinguished from other western
democracies.
74. Lamont v. Postmaster-General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
75. See discussion infra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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bring about equal competition in the marketplace are violative of the
First Amendment.76
C. A Look Back: The History of the First Amendment and Its Function in
the American Constitutional System
The development of the First Amendment as the constitutional basis
of the protection of freedom of expression is generally considered to
have begun with First Amendment challenges to espionage and sedition
prosecutions during World War I and the "red scare" that followed, as
indicated by cases such as Schenck v. United States,77 Abrams v. United
States,78 Gittlow v. New York, 79 and Whitney v. California.80 These
challenges were generally unsuccessful. While the First Amendment was
recognized doctrinally as a basis for challenging these laws, the Court
applied the "clear and present danger" test and came down on the side of
upholding the challenged law or governmental action at issue.8 1 In the
1930s, the Court began to sustain First Amendment challenges under this
test, in effect protecting the oppositional speech of the socialists,
communists, anarchists, and similar groups, which consisted of criticism
of the government in Marxist terms and discussion of abstract Marxist
doctrine, including violent overthrow of the government. 82 By the 1950s,
the "clear and present danger" test had been firmly established as the
doctrinal basis for determining the First Amendment protection afforded
to advocacy of illegal action and other expression directed toward dissent
and social change efforts.83 The Court had also invoked the "clear and
76. It is for this reason that campaign finance regulations attempting to equalize the
funds available to candidates who are receiving public funds and candidates who are self-
financing their campaigns violate the First Amendment. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S 724,
744 (2008); Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2829 (2011).
77. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
78. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
79. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
80. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
81. See, e.g., Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("It is said to be the
function of the legislature to determine whether at a particular time and under the
particular circumstances the formation of, or assembly with, a society organized to
advocate criminal syndicalism constitutes a clear and present danger of substantive evil;
and that by enacting the law here in question the Legislature of California determined that
question in the affirmative.").
82. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 263-64 (1937); De Jonge v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
83. There was some regression on this issue during the Cold War period, when the
Court interpreted the "clear and present danger" test rather loosely in order to sustain the
constitutionality of laws directed against the Communist Party, which was widely
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present danger" test to strike down efforts by judges to punish "contempt
of court by publication."8
More significantly, beginning in the 1930s and continuing thereafter,
the Court invoked the First Amendment in a number of contexts to strike
down laws and governmental actions affecting freedom of expression.85
These cases became the genesis for a number of First Amendment
doctrines currently in effect. In the area of prior restraint and the
licensing of expression, there was Near v. Minnesota,86 striking down an
injunction against the publication of a "scandalous, or defamatory
publication," as well as Lovell v. City of Griffin87 and Staub v. City of
Baxley,88 invalidating standardless laws licensing expression. Bans on
the distribution of literature and other forms of expression in the public
streets and parks were held unconstitutional in cases such as Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organizations89 and Schneider v. Irvington.90 In
Martin v. Struthers,91 the Court held unconstitutional an absolute ban on
knocking on doors or ringing doorbells in order to deliver handbills. In
Terminiello v. Chicago,9 2 the Court held that the First Amendment
protected speech that "induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,93 the Court held
that the First Amendment protected the right to refrain from speaking
believed to be controlled by the Soviet Union and a part of an international conspiracy
directed toward bringing about violent revolution in the United States. See, e.g., Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951). However, in a series of decisions beginning
with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 303 (1957), and culminating in Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1969), the Court began a process that effectively overruled
Dennis and that, by a combination of statutory interpretation and constitutional holdings,
rendered nugatory virtually all of the anticommunist legislation enacted during the Cold
War period. Under the reformulated "clear and present danger" test, advocacy of illegal
action is constitutionally protected until it becomes "likely to incite or produce imminent
lawless action," which effectively protects virtually any expression directed toward
dissent and social change effort. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441,
448 (1974); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973). See infra notes 249-51 and
accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 350 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941).
85. See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
86. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
87. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
88. 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
89. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
90. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
91. 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943).
92. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
93. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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and to avoid being forced to express an idea with which a person
disagrees, concluding that a public school could not constitutionally
expel a Jehovah's Witness child for failing to salute the American flag.
During this time, the Court developed what has come to be known as the
overbreadth or "void on its face" doctrine, under which a law regulating
or applying to acts of expression can be challenged on its face on the
ground that the terms of the law are so broad or vague that the law could
be applied to constitutionally protected acts of expression.94 In addition,
this was the time when the Court first extended constitutional protection
to sexual expression by holding that all descriptions and depictions of
sexual activity, even in very graphic ways, were protected by the First
Amendment, except for a very-narrowly defined category of obscenity.95
The Court also held that the state could not limit sexual expression for
adults to that which would be suitable for children. 96
In the 1960s, the Court applied the First Amendment in case after
case to strike down state officials' efforts to repress the civil rights
movement in the South by prosecuting protestorS97 and searching the
membership rolls of civil rights organizations.98 This was also the
context in which the Court promulgated the New York Times rule, which
mandates that no recovery is available for false statements about public
officials or public figures unless the plaintiff can prove that the statement
was knowingly false or was made with "reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."" In another series of cases in the 1960s, the Court
invoked the First Amendment to curtail the power of legislative
investigating committees to inquire into people's beliefs and
associations.1 o In another line of cases, the Court used the First
94. See, e.g., Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (addressing the use of a film
licensing statute banning "sacrilegious" motion pictures); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940) (addressing an absolute ban on peaceful picketing); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931) (addressing the display of a flag in opposition to organized
government). In such a case, there is no concern with whether or not the activity of the
party subject to the law is itself constitutionally protected. See, e.g., Burstyn, at 504-06.
95. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85, 487-88 (1957).
96. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383-84 (1957).
97. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Brown
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 133, 141 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 574 (1965);
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963).
98. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 480-81, 490 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462
(1958).
99. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). See infra note 252 and
accompanying text for further discussion of the New York Times rule.
100. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1966); Gibson v.
Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1963).
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Amendment to protect academic freedom by invalidating the widespread
use of loyalty oaths designed to enforce political conformity on
university campuses and in public schools.o'0 In addition, in 1969, the
Court held that the First Amendment protected advocacy of unlawful
action up to the point at which it is directed toward inciting imminent
unlawful action and is likely to incite or produce such action.102
101. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 592, 603-04 (1967); Baggett
v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 361, 366 (1964); Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278,
279, 287-88 (1961).
102. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969). During the late 1960s, the
Court rendered a series of decisions upholding the First Amendment claims of Vietnam
War protestors. Without deciding whether a ban on flag desecration itself violated the
First Amendment, the Court reversed convictions for flag desecration on other First
Amendment grounds. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (holding that
placing peace symbol with removable tape over flag was protected speech because it did
not impair physical integrity of flag); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568, 573 (1974)
(finding a prohibition of contemptuous treatment of flag reached expressive conduct and
so was void on its face for overbreadth); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 590-91, 594
(1969) (reversing conviction where instruction to jury would permit conviction for
uttering critical words rather than for burning the flag). In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 23, 26 (1971), the Court held that the constitutional protection of offensive speech
precluded a conviction for the public display of a jacket containing an "unseemly
expletive" ("fuck the draft"). The only case in which the Court upheld a conviction for
protesting against the Vietnam War was United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77
(1968), in which the Court applied the symbolic speech doctrine to uphold a conviction
for burning a draft card in violation of federal law. See infra p. 1057 and notes 280-85
and accompanying text.
In United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 168 (1st Cir. 1969), the court set aside four
convictions for a conspiracy to counsel draftees to refuse induction into the armed
services. The case arose out of the circulation of a document entitled "A Call to Resist
Illegitimate Authority," along with a "cover letter requesting signatures and support." Id.
Dr. Benjamin Spock, the famous "baby doctor" who had authored a widely-used book on
infant care, Rev. William Sloane Coffin, Jr., the Chaplain at Yale University, and two
lesser known persons signed the letter. Id. See Marc D. Charney, Rev. William Sloane
Coffin Dies at 81; Fought for Civil Rights and Against the Way, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 13,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/ 13coffin.html?pagewanted=all8_r-0. See
also Eric Pace, Benjamin Spock, World's Pediatrician, Dies at 94, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0502.html. Following
circulation of the letter, two of the defendants participated in a draft card submission and
burning in Boston. Spock, 416 F.2d at 168. Afterward, the "four defendants attended a
demonstration in Washington, in the course of which an unsuccessful attempt was made
to present" the draft cards to the Attorney General. Id. The First Circuit held that because
First Amendment activity was involved, the government had to show that the defendants
had the specific intent to engage in a conspiracy to counsel registrants to refuse induction.
Id. at 172-73. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show specific intent on
the part of Spock and another defendant. Id. at 177-79, 183. In addition, the court held
that while the evidence was sufficient to show intent with respect to Coffin and the fourth
defendant, the court reversed their convictions, finding that the lower court erred when it
directed the jury to make specific findings rather than to return a general verdict. Id.
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The strong protection of freedom of expression by the Supreme
Court continued through the 1970s and 1980s. 0 3 The Court held that
there was no "national security" exception to the First Amendment, and
thus the government could not obtain an injunction against the
publication of "secret" governmental documents allegedly harmful to
national security."' The Court upheld the right of an opponent of the
Vietnam War to make a public protest by the use of an "unseemly
expletive." 05 Going further, the Court held that the First Amendment
protected the right to burn the American flag as a means of protesting
against the government and governmental action.' 0 6 Looking to the
history of the First Amendment and to the results of the cases that the
Supreme Court decided prior to 1991 when I wrote the original article, I
could confidently say that "the 'Law of the First Amendment' also has
resulted in a very high degree of constitutional protection for freedom of
expression in this nation."1 07
In its post-1991 decisions, the Court has continued to afford strong
protection to First Amendment rights and has resisted any attempts to
diminish that protection. It has held that the government may not try to
advance "good" ideas, such as equality, by prohibiting the expression of
"bad" ideas, such as those that promote inequality. 08 It has strongly
The defendants were not retried. Following the decision in Spock, the federal
government did not initiate any more conspiracy cases. The extensive protest against the
Vietnam War and the military draft continued unabated throughout the Nation, and it is
reasonable to believe that this extensive protest contributed to the decision of the
President to end American involvement in the Vietnam War in early 1973 and the
decision of Congress to repeal the draft in 1972. The antiwar protest during the Vietnam
War is a classic example of the dissent and social change function of the First
Amendment, and the Court extended constitutional protection to that protest at that time.
103. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. See also discussion infra pp.1053-55.
104. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case), 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (plurality opinion). See also id. at 741-42 (Marshall, J., concurring).
105. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23, 26.
106. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406, 420 (1989).
107. Sedler, supra note 1, at 458.
108. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386, 391 (1992). In that case,
the Court held that a law prohibiting only "fighting words" that expressed a message of
"racial hatred," but permitting "fighting words" that expressed a message of "racial
tolerance," violated the First Amendment. Id. The effect of R.A. V. was to confirm the
result in lower court cases, such as Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 856,
864 (E.D. Mich. 1989), which the author litigated and which struck down a university
policy prohibiting speech that created an "intimidating, hostile, or demeaning
environment" for racial minorities, women, gay and lesbian persons, and other "protected
groups." See also Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1184 (6th Cir. 1995);
Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech:" The
View from Without and Within, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 631, 646 (1992).
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reaffirmed the right to protest, holding in a recent decision that there is a
right to demonstrate in the vicinity of a military funeral and to contend
that the death of American soldiers is divine punishment for America's
tolerance of homosexuality."' The Court has refused to take any
category of supposed "bad" speech out of the protection of the First
Amendment, striking down a federal law prohibiting the depiction of acts
of animal cruelty committed against living animals"o and a state law
prohibiting the sale of "violent video games" to minors."' In addition,
the Court has extended the constitutional protections afforded to
commercial speech.1 12 Most significantly, the Court has held that the
First Amendment protects the right to make independent expenditures on
behalf of political candidates and political issues." 3 Thus, the Court has
held unconstitutional a federal law prohibiting corporations and labor
unions from using their general funds to make independent expenditures
on behalf of political candidates,"l 4 another federal law imposing a
limitation on independent expenditures by political parties,"'5 and a
number of other federal and state laws regulating campaign financing
and political activity." 6
It is indisputably clear today that constitutional doctrine and
precedent are strongly on the side of protecting freedom of expression in
all its manifestations.'" 7 Therefore, I can say now, as I did in the original
109. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216-19 (2011).
110. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585, 1592 (2010).
111. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2740-42 (2011).
112. See infra Part III.D.5 and accompanying text.
113. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51 (1976); FEC v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985).
114. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
115. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado Republican 1), 518
U.S. 604, 608 (1996).
116. See infra notes 350-55 and accompanying text.
117. In its last three terms, the Court has held violative of the First Amendment a wide
range of laws. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547-48 (2012) (finding a
content-based restriction in the federal Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §704 (West 2006-
2012), which made it a crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals);
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220-21 (2011) (allowing anti-gay picketing at a
funeral); Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011) (allowing
children to play violent video games); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (finding
independent corporate expenditures to be political speech); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2661-72 (2011) (invalidating law prohibiting pharmaceutical
marketing); Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2820-25 (2011)
(addressing a state campaign regulation in which candidates who accepted public
financing for foregoing private contributions would receive additional public financing to
match the amount that their opponents, in conjunction with independent supporters, spent
beyond the public financing cap.); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010)
(invalidating law prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty).
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article, that the protection afforded to freedom of expression is perhaps
the strongest protection afforded to any individual right in our
constitutional system."'8 It is also fair to say that the constitutional
protection afforded to freedom of expression in the United States is
seemingly unparalleled in other constitutional systems and that in the
United States, as a constitutional matter, the "value of freedom of
expression generally prevails over other democratic values.""'9 As I will
now demonstrate, the strong constitutional protection afforded to
freedom of expression is reflected in and is the result of the development
of the "Law of the First Amendment."
El. THE "LAW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT"
A. The Meaning and Operation of the "Law of the First Amendment"
The "Law of the First Amendment" consists in large part of the
chilling effect concept as well as principles and specific doctrines that
the Court has developed over the years through the process of resolving
First Amendment cases. The principles and specific doctrines are
supplemented by the Court's precedents in particular areas of First
Amendment activity, but more often than not, the result in a First
Amendment case is determined by the Court's application of the
appropriate principle or specific doctrine. To put it another way, the
precedents in a particular area of First Amendment activity become
determinative only when the case cannot be resolved by application of a
principle or specific doctrine.120  In the context of actual First
118. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 458 n.3.
119. See Sedler, supra note 10, at 383.
120. As a practical matter, in any First Amendment case, as in any other constitutional
case, lawyers and judges will begin their analysis of the First Amendment issue by
looking to the applicable precedents. In many cases, the applicable precedents will
involve the Court's application of the principles and doctrines. In a case involving the
regulation of advertising, for example, the applicable doctrine is the commercial speech
doctrine, and the relevant precedents involve the Court's application of that doctrine. See,
e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980). Therefore, when we refer to the precedents in particular areas of First
Amendment activity, we are referring to precedents that did not involve, at least directly,
the Court's application of principles or doctrines. To illustrate, some cases involve
restrictions on expression relating to the administration of justice. If the restriction takes
the form of an injunction against expression, such as the issuance of an injunction against
the media prohibiting the publication of facts connected with a criminal prosecution in
order to prevent "prejudicial publicity" against the accused, the prior restraint doctrine
applies, and under that doctrine, the restriction will generally be held unconstitutional.
See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1976); Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist.
Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977). So too, where a law imposes an absolute ban on
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Amendment litigation, First Amendment analysis is very much a matter
of identification and application. In many cases, once the Court identifies
and applies the appropriate principle or specific doctrine, the parameters
for the resolution of the constitutional question at issue have been
established and the result is often fairly clear.12 1
The matter of identification and application of the appropriate
principle or specific doctrine is illustrated most clearly by a case such as
Boos v. Barry.122 In Boos, a challenge was brought against a provision of
the District of Columbia Code, which prohibited the "display of any sign
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy" that tends to bring the foreign
government into "public odium" or "public disrepute."' 23 Another
challenged provision, as construed, prohibited the "congregation of three
or more persons within 500 feet of a foreign embassy" "when the police
reasonably believe that a threat to the security or peace of the embassy is
present."l 24 Although both provisions regulate expression within 500 feet
of a foreign embassy, they differ in their terms, and it is this difference
that triggers different components of the "Law of the First
Amendment." 25
The "display clause" proscribes speech because of its content: it
prohibits displays that are critical of the foreign government, but not
displays that are favorable to the foreign government.'26 This being so,
the display clause triggers the First Amendment principle of content
neutrality-here, that aspect of the principle which precludes the
government from differentiating between types of expression based on
the particular viewpoint that is being expressed.12 7 Because the display
clause violated this aspect of the principle of content neutrality-to
which the Court has never recognized any exceptions-it was held
unconstitutional .128
witnesses disclosing their testimony before a grand jury after the grand jury's term has
concluded, the absolute ban brings into play the narrow specificity principle. See
Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 633-36 (1990). On the other hand, where the law in
question imposes only a post-publication sanction and is more specific in its prohibitions,
neither the prior restraint doctrine nor the narrow specificity principle is applicable. This
being so, the case will be decided with reference to the precedents applicable to
restrictions on expression relating to the administration of justice. See infra Part III.E.I.
121. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1988) (identifying and applying
the principle of context neutrality).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 315-16.
124. Id. at 315-16, 330.
125. Id. at 317-21, 329-32.
126. Id. at 318-19.
127. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318-21.
128. Id. at 318-321, 329.
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The "congregation clause," however, is content neutral. It comes into
play not because of the particular viewpoint expressed, but because of
the threat the particular congregation of persons is deemed to pose to the
security or peace of the embassy.12 9 This being so, this provision triggers
the public forum doctrine, which permits the government to impose a
reasonable and content neutral time, place, and manner regulation on
access to a public forum, such as the public streets.130 Under this
doctrine, the only question to be decided is whether the particular
regulation is "reasonable,"3 ' and here, the Court held that the regulation
was reasonable on its face.13 2
This case illustrates that in actual First Amendment litigation, the
operation of the "Law of the First Amendment" effectively supplants the
analytical significance of the Court's articulated standard of review.133 In
most First Amendment cases, the articulated standard of review is
"heightened scrutiny," which requires that the restriction be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and narrowly drawn to serve that
interest.134 In some cases, such as those involving access to governmental
property for purposes of expression or commercial speech, the articulated
standard of review is "intermediate scrutiny," which indicates that there
is a greater likelihood that the Court will uphold the challenged
regulation.' 35
However, in practice, the Court does not apply the articulated
standard of review in the same analytical way in a First Amendment case
as it does, for example, in a due process or equal protection case. Rather,
the Court applies the appropriate principle, specific doctrine, or
precedent in the particular area of First Amendment activity to the facts
of the case, and the Court's application of the appropriate component of
the "Law of the First Amendment" often controls the result, or at least
sets the parameters for resolving the First Amendment question at issue.
When the Court is applying heightened scrutiny, as it does in most First
129. Id. at 329-333.
130. Id. at 318, 321.
131. See infra Part III.D.7 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factors that
determine "reasonableness."
132. Boos, 485 U.S. at 331. Note that the regulation could be found to be
unconstitutional as applied in a particular case.
133. See id. at 321-29 ("Our cases indicate that as a content-based restriction on
political speech in a public forum, § 22-115 must be subjected to the most exacting
scrutiny.").
134. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011); Brown v.
Enter. Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
135. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
1030 [Vol. 58:1003
2013] THE "LAW OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT" REVISITED 1031
Amendment cases, any consideration of the "compelling" nature of the
asserted governmental interest or the narrowness of the restriction takes
place only in the context of the Court's application of the appropriate
component of the "Law of the First Amendment."' 3 6 Similarly, when the
Court is dealing with a matter to which intermediate scrutiny applies,
such as access to public property for purposes of expression, the Court
simply invokes and applies the public forum doctrine.' 37 In practice then,
the articulated standard of review has limited analytical significance, and
the Court's analysis proceeds with reference to the components of the
"Law of the First Amendment." It is only in those relatively few cases
when none of the components of the "Law of the First Amendment"
appear to be applicable that the result will depend on the Court's
application of the articulated standard of review.' 3 8 We will now turn to
the components of the "Law of the First Amendment."
B. The Chilling Effect Concept
The chilling effect concept is a fundamental and pervasive concept in
the "Law of the First Amendment." Precisely because the "Law of the
First Amendment" developed initially in response to governmental
repression of dissent and the expression of unpopular ideas,139 the Court
has always been concerned with a chilling effect on expression that could
result from laws and governmental action regulating or applying to acts
of expression.140 As we will see, the chilling effect concept has been the
basis of the overbreadth doctrine and the New York Times rule.'4'
Moreover, the possibility of a serious chilling effect on expression is an
analytical basis for invalidating any regulation of expression. 142 It is for
136. See, e.g., Boos, 485 U.S. at 321-29 (recognizing that a compelling "dignity
interest" might exist, but finding the law unconstitutional for lack of content-neutrality).
137. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 790-91 (1994).
138. For an example of such a case, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), in
which the Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit Congress from extending
the term of new and existing copyrights to seventy years and rejected what the Court
called a "plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards." The Court had
previously held that the "fair use" provision of the federal copyright act, 17 U.S.C.A. §
107, properly accommodated the relevant First Amendment interests. Harper & Row v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
139. See supra Part IL.C and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
141. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. See also discussion infra p. 1052.
142. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243, 254-58 (1974)
(invalidating state law requiring newspaper to give right of reply to political candidate
that it attacked in print because it could have a chilling effect on political commentary);
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this reason that the chilling effect concept is pervasive throughout First
Amendment litigation, and a concern for a possible chilling effect may
strongly influence the Court's decision in a particular First Amendment
case.
C. First Amendment Principles: Content Neutrality, Narrow Specificity,
the Protection of Offensive Speech, and the Right to Remain Silent
First Amendment principles are independently significant, so that
their application may determine the result in a particular case. They also
may be incorporated into specific doctrines, and when they are, they tend
to be a very important part of that doctrine. I have identified four
principles, which I will now discuss in more detail.143
1. The Content Neutrality Principle
[T]he most important First Amendment principle in terms of
its applicability in [actual] litigation is the principle of content
neutrality. Under this principle, the government may not
proscribe any expression because of its content, and an otherwise
valid regulation [will] violate[] the First Amendment if it
[discriminates] between [different] types of expression based on
Lamont v. Postmaster-Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (invalidating federal law
permitting mail delivery of "communist political propaganda" if addressee specifically
requested delivery in writing because of possible chilling effect on willingness of
identified recipients to receive "communist political propaganda"). In Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003), the Court held that the state could constitutionally prohibit as a
"true threat" the burning of a cross "with the intent to intimidate" a person or group. The
Court also held that the First Amendment precluded the state from making cross-burning
"prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate." Id. at 347-48. The Court reasoned that this
provision could result in a conviction for cross-burning without proof of intent to
intimidate, and so it could have a chilling effect on cross-burning without the intent to
intimidate, which is constitutionally protected. Id. at 364-67. See also Robert A. Sedler,
Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. Pot'Y 13,
24-43 (2011) (discussing the chilling effect concept in relation to the New York Times
rule and overbreadth doctrine, the concept to which the author refers as "self-censorship
bad"). See also discussion infra Part III.D.1 (chilling effect in relation to overbreadth
doctrine); discussion infra Part III.D.4 (chilling effect in relation to New York Times
rule).
143. In the earlier article, I discussed the principle of heightened protection against
interference with expression in the academic context. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 471-73.
The principle was applicable to challenge the loyalty oaths of the 1950s and 1960s, the
campus restrictions on student speech in the 1960s and 1970s, and the campus speech
codes of the 1980s and 1990s. Id. With the demise of those kinds of restrictions on
freedom of expression on university campuses, this principle is unimportant today.
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content. Analytically, there are two aspects to the principle of
content neutrality: viewpoint neutrality and category neutrality.
Under the viewpoint neutrality aspect of the principle, [to which
the Supreme Court has recognized no exceptions,] the
government cannot regulate expression in such a way as to favor
one viewpoint over another [viewpoint].'"
Thus, as discussed earlier, a law prohibiting the display of any sign
in front of a foreign embassy that "tends to bring the foreign government
into 'public odium' or 'public disrepute"' violates the First Amendment,
since it "only prohibits displays that are critical of the foreign
government [and] not displays that are favorable to [it]."45 So does a
"federal law that allow[s] the wearing of [American] military uniforms in
a portrayal only if that portrayal [does] not 'tend to discredit the
military.""" The viewpoint neutrality aspect of the principle formed the
basis of the Court's invalidation of state and federal laws prohibiting the
burning of the American flag. 14 7 Since the laws "authorized burning as a
proper means of disposing of a torn or soiled flag, [] the thrust of the ban
was directed toward the 'content of the message' conveyed by the
burning," and so the laws were unconstitutional.14 8 The Court has also
invalidated, as a content-based restriction on political speech, a judicial
conduct rule that prohibited candidates for judicial office from
announcing their views on "disputed legal or political issues."l49 In
another case, the Court held that a regulation of the federal agency
funding for local legal assistance programs that prohibited those
programs from engaging in representations involving efforts to amend or
challenge the validity of existing welfare laws was impermissible
viewpoint discrimination and therefore unconstitutional. 50 Moreover,
because the government cannot discriminate against religious speech, so
long as providing a particular benefit (such as access to public facilities)
to a religious group would not violate the Establishment Clause, 5 1 the
government is required by the content neutrality principle to provide the
144. Id. at 466.
145. Id. at 459. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316-16, 318-19 (1988).
146. Sedler, supra note 1, at 467 (quoting Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 59-60
(1970)).
147. Id. at 468 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416-18 (1989)).
148. Id. at 467-68 (citing Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412). See also United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990).
149. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
150. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 536 (2001).
151. U.S. CONST. amend 1.
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benefit to that group. 152 The strength of the content neutrality principle is
demonstrated by the fact, as discussed previously, that even though
"fighting words" are not entitled to First Amendment protection, the
government cannot only prohibit "fighting words" that express a
message of "racial hatred" and permit "fighting words" that express a
message of racial tolerance.'5 3
The concern with preventing viewpoint discrimination is embodied
in the public forum doctrine, the variant of the prior restraint doctrine
dealing with the licensing of expression, and the symbolic speech
doctrine.1 54 Under the public forum doctrine, any regulation of
expression in a public forum must take the form of a content neutral
time, place, and manner regulation. 55 Similarly, when the government
152. In all of the numerous cases presenting this issue, the Court held that providing
the particular benefit to the religious group would not violate the Establishment Clause.
See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 135 (2001) (holding that a
school district that allowed after-school use of its facilities for "instruction in education,
learning, or the arts" and "social, civic, recreational, and entertainment uses pertaining to
the community welfare" could not deny access to a private Christian organization that
wanted to use the facilities for religious activities for children); Capital Square Review
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 757 (1995) (addressing a group's desire to erect a
Christmas display of a cross in a plaza in front of a state capitol that had been dedicated
as a public forum); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-29 (1995) (holding
that a public university that paid printing costs of student organizations could not refuse
to pay printing costs of a religiously-oriented student publication); Good News Club v.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386 (1993)
(holding that a school district that permitted after-hours use of school facilities for
"social, civic and recreational purposes" by private organizations could not prohibit such
use of school facilities by a private organization for the showing of a "[f]amily oriented
movie-from a Christian perspective"); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981)
(addressing a public university student group's wish to use a designated public forum for
religious worship and discussion). See also Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 231
(1990) (upholding a federal law prohibiting school districts receiving federal funds from
discriminating against religious groups in regard to access to school facilities). For the
same reason, when a public university grants official recognition to student groups, it
cannot refuse recognition to a group because of its political views. See Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 170 (1972). In addition, a public university must grant official recognition
to gay and lesbian groups. See, e.g., Gay Student Servs. v. Tex. A & M Univ., 737 F.2d
1317, 1319 (5th Cir. 1984).
153. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992). In the same vein,
although the First Amendment does not protect against obscenity, the government cannot
prohibit only that obscenity that depicts inequality in a sexual relationship, such as a
"civil rights anti-pornography" law that defined proscribed pornography as the "graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women." Am. Bookseller Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771
F.2d 323, 331-32 (7th Cir. 1985).
154. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 473-80.
155. See infra Part III.D.7 and accompanying text. Under the public forum doctrine,
the government may regulate access to a non-public forum on the basis of "reasonable"
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requires a license to engage in acts of expression, the licensing law on its
face must not only be content neutral, but it must contain narrow,
objective, and definite standards that control the discretion of the
licensing official.s 6 An essential element of the symbolic speech
doctrine, which applies to governmental regulation of expression that
combines "speech" and "non-speech" elements, is that the regulation
must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression and so cannot
regulate expression because of its content.15 7
Under the category neutrality aspect of the principle, to which the
Court has recognized only limited exceptions, the "government generally
cannot regulate in such a way as to [discriminate] between [different]
categories of expression . . . and an otherwise valid regulation will be
found to violate the First Amendment" if it discriminates on this basis. 5 8
Thus, a "ban on picketing within 150 feet of a school building while the
school was in session," which could otherwise stand as a reasonable
time, place, and manner regulation of expression, was unconstitutional
because it contained an exception for picketing in connection with a
labor dispute.'59 There are numerous other examples of laws invalidated
under the category neutrality aspect of the content neutrality principle;
these include a law prohibiting drive-in movie theaters from showing
films containing nudity when the screen was visible from the highway,
since the law singled out one kind of film for differential treatment based
on its content.'6 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court invalidated a law
imposing "blocking" restrictions only on cable channels that were
primarily transmitting sexually oriented programming.' 6' They also
include a law that discriminated between expression and other activities
by requiring that proceeds from a book written by a criminal about the
crime be used to compensate crime victims and not requiring
compensation from the criminal's other assets.162 In addition, under the
category neutrality of the content neutrality principle, the state may not
regulations. To be "reasonable," the regulation necessarily must be content neutral. See
infra Part Ill.D.7.
156. See infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
157. For this reason, laws prohibiting the burning of the American flag, which the
Court held violated the content neutrality principle, could not be upheld as a permissible
regulation of symbolic speech. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
158. Sedler, supra note 1, at 468.
159. Id. (citing Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). See also Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457-59 (1980) (invalidating a non-category neutral statute on
equal protection grounds).
160. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1975).
161. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 806-19 (2000).
162. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 108 (1992).
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impose selective taxation against the press by imposing a tax on general
interest magazines, but not on religious, professional, trade, and sports
journals.' 63 Along the same lines, the state may not impose selective
taxation by imposing a gross receipts tax only on publications with
weekly circulations above 20,000.16 Further, the state may not impose
selective taxation by imposing a special use tax on the cost of paper and
ink consumed in the production of publications, with an annual
exemption for the first $100,000 worth of paper and ink, so that only 16
of the state's 374 paid circulation papers are liable for the tax, and one
paper is responsible for two-thirds of the revenue raised by the tax.1 65
The Court has recognized two limited exceptions to the
requirement of category neutrality in government regulation,
both involving the regulation of particular "lower-level" speech.
First, to deal with the secondary consequences resulting from the
concentration of businesses purveying sexually explicit
materials, a [government] can enact zoning regulations requiring
such businesses to spread out.'6 Second, because commercial
speech receives less constitutional protection than
noncommercial speech, [the Court has held that] a billboard
regulation does not violate the First Amendment when it
exempts some commercial billboards from the regulation,
although it does violate the First Amendment when it exempts
some noncommercial billboards from the regulation.' 67
With these limited exceptions, the Court has held unconstitutional all
laws that it has found to be content-based, and it has not distinguished
between what I have called "viewpoint neutrality" and "category
neutrality."' 68 I have made the distinction only for the purpose of
163. See Ark. Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223 (1987).
164. See Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 240 (1936).
165. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
577-81 (1983).
166. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986). See also
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976). The Court in Young
emphasized that while the regulation was on the basis of the category of speech involved,
the regulation was "unaffected by whatever social, political, or philosophical message a
film may be intended to communicate." Id. at 70.
167. Sedler, supra note 1, at 469-70. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453
U.S. 490, 493, 515 (1981). As we will see later, because the government may reserve
public property that is not a "public forum" for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, it may impose category-type access restrictions to such property if appropriate
to the purpose for which the property is being used. Sedler, supra note 1, at 473-80.
168. Sedler, supra note 1, at 466.
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showing that there are two aspects to the content neutrality principle and
that the Court has allowed limited exceptions to the category aspect of
the principle.169 In the context of actual litigation, all that matters is that
the challenged law contains content-based restrictions.170 When the law
does contain content-based restrictions, the content neutrality principle
applies, and it is very likely that the law will be invalidated.171
In a very recent application of the content neutrality principle, the
Court held unconstitutional a Vermont law that prohibited pharmacies
from selling or disclosing pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing
practices of individual doctors and that prohibited the use of this
information for marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.17 2 The
Court found that "[o]n its face, the law enact[ed] content- and speaker-
based restriction[s]."l73 The Court reasoned that this kind of information
could be used by those who wished to engage in certain "educational
communications," such as academic organizations, for "use in countering
the messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in
promoting the prescription of generic drugs." 74 The Court applied
"heightened scrutiny" to the regulation and concluded that the state could
not justify prohibiting the use of this information for marketing purposes
while permitting its use for educational purposes.175
169. Id. at 468-70.
170. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining that
"content-based regulations are presumptively invalid").
171. See id.
172. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
173. Id. at 2656.
174. Id. at 2663.
175. Id. at 2656-57. The state argued that a lesser standard of scrutiny should apply
here because the speech at issue was commercial speech. Id. at 2664. The Court found
that it was not necessary to decide whether the speech constituted commercial speech
within the meaning of the commercial speech doctrine, because even if it did, under the
commercial speech doctrine, the state could not have a substantial interest in suppressing
a disfavored message. Id. at 2668. In Alvarez, four Justices applied the content neutrality
principle to hold unconstitutional the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 704(b)-(c) (West
2006), which made it a "crime to falsely claim receipt of military decorations or medals."
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2539 (2012). The plurality opinion by Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Sotomayor,
found that false statements were entitled to constitutional protection and that the law
violated content neutrality by singling out only one category of false statements for
prohibition. Id. at 2547-48. Justices Breyer and Kagan did not base their conclusion on
the content neutrality analysis of the plurality opinion, but instead invoked the narrow
specificity principle to find that the government could advance "its legitimate objectives
in less restrictive ways" than by an absolute prohibition on false statements about receipt
of military medals or decorations. Id. at 2554-55 (Breyer, J., concurring). The result was
a 6-3 decision, holding the law unconstitutional. Id. at 2537. See Jonathan D. Varat,
Deception and the First Amendment: A Central, Complex, and Somewhat Curious
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The principle of content neutrality is a very powerful principle. 176 As
the Court has stated, "It is rare that a regulation restricting speech
because of its content will ever be permissible."1 77 In the context of
Relationship, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1107, 1118-19 (2006), for an interesting discussion of
First Amendment protection to deceptive speech, including the observation that the
content neutrality principle limits the government's power to prohibit deceptive speech.
176. As discussed, the theory of the marketplace of ideas is the foundation for the
content neutrality principle. See supra Part II.B. The content neutrality principle
implements the theory of the marketplace of ideas by ensuring that, under the First
Amendment, there can be no such thing as a "false idea" and that all ideas, "good" and
"bad," must be able to compete in the marketplace of ideas. See supra note 72 and
accompanying text. It is the content neutrality principle that, as a constitutional matter,
sets the United States apart from most other democratic nations, where "bad" ideas, such
as genocide and racism, are not constitutionally protected and are proscribed by
international human rights norms. See Sedler, supra note 10. See also Rosenfeld, supra
note 73, at 1566-67, for a critical view of the content neutrality principle and the resulting
protection of "hate speech," setting the United States apart from other western
democracies. The author contends as follows:
As hate speech can now almost instantaneously spread throughout the world,
and as nations become increasingly socially, ethnically, religiously and
culturally diverse, the need for regulation becomes ever more urgent. In view of
these important changes the state can no longer justify commitment to
neutrality, but must embrace pluralism, guarantee autonomy and dignity, and
strive for maintenance of a minimum of mutual respect. Commitment to these
values requires states to conduct an active struggle against hate speech, while at
the same time avoiding the pitfalls bound to be encountered in the pursuit of
that struggle. It would of course be preferable if hate could be defeated by
reason. But since unfortunately that has failed all too often, there seems no
alternative but to combat hate speech through regulation in order to secure a
minimum of civility in the public arena.
Id.
Under the content neutrality principle, however, we are committed to rely on
reason rather than regulation, even at the cost of a lack of a "minimum of civility in the
public arena." Id. at 1567.
177. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2738 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529
U.S. 803, 818 (2000)). The content neutrality principle has been subject to repeated
academic criticism, primarily on the ground that it precludes the state from regulating
speech that violates the rights of other persons to personal security, privacy, reputation,
and equality. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
647, 672 (2002). The content neutrality principle has also been criticized for failing to
balance the harm caused to freedom of speech by the particular regulation against the
government's valid interest in imposing the regulation. See Barry P. McDonald, Speech
and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1363 (2006). Moreover, of course, it results in the
protection of "hate speech," which is not protected in other democratic nations. See
Rosenfeld, supra note 73. If the Court has taken any notice of this academic criticism, it
has not so indicated in its decisions applying the content neutrality principle to invalidate
the law or regulation at issue.
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actual First Amendment litigation, the lawyer challenging a law or
governmental action will endeavor to show that the law or governmental
action is content-based.178 If it is, the content neutrality principle applies,
and the law or governmental action is unlikely to stand. 79
2. The Narrow Specificity Principle
The narrow specificity principle reflects the heightened scrutiny that
the Court gives to any regulation of expression and a concern that the
regulation will not go beyond what is clearly necessary to advance the
asserted governmental interest.'8 0 As the Supreme Court has stated,
"Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,
government may regulate in this area only with narrow specificity."' 8
This being so, any regulation of expression is always subject to challenge
on the ground that it sweeps more broadly than is necessary to advance
the legitimate governmental interests at stake.' 82 Under the principle of
narrow specificity, absolute prohibitions on expressive activity will
frequently be found to be unconstitutional, since the asserted
governmental interest could be advanced by narrower means than an
absolute prohibition.' 83 As we will see, the narrow specificity principle is
178. Conversely, the lawyer defending the law will try to demonstrate that it is content-
neutral so that it is more likely to be upheld. In Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a public university's use of a mandatory student activity fee to
provide grants to student organizations, because the criteria for awarding the grants was
content-neutral. However, another provision of the policy provided for a student
referendum on funding for a particular student organization, and the Court indicated that
this provision might violate content neutrality. Id. at 221. The record was not clear on this
issue, and the case was remanded. Id.
179. See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (stating that "[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid").
180. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985) (stating the principle that a regulation must be narrowly drawn) (citing Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
181. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
182. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960) (invalidating a requirement
that public school teachers list all of the organizations to which they had belonged or had
contributed money during the preceding five years).
183. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990) (holding unconstitutional an
absolute ban on witnesses' disclosure of testimony given before a grand jury, even after
the grand jury's term has been completed); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457
U.S. 596, 598 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a statute requiring exclusion of the press
and public during the testimony of a minor victim of a sex offense); Schad v. Borough of
Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62 (1981) (holding unconstitutional a prohibition of all live
entertainment in a city's small commercial zone); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 149 (1943) (holding unconstitutional an absolute ban on knocking on doors or
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incorporated into the commercial speech doctrine, which includes a
requirement that the regulation not be more extensive than is necessary
to advance the asserted important governmental interest.184 In light of the
narrow specificity principle, in First Amendment litigation, the party
challenging the regulation will frequently try to demonstrate that a
narrower regulation would advance the asserted governmental interest,
while the party defending the regulation will try to demonstrate that the
regulation was drawn as narrowly as possible to advance that interest.'8 5
3. The Protection of Offensive Speech
Under this principle, the government cannot prohibit the
expression of an idea on the ground that the idea itself or the
manner in which the idea is expressed is highly offensive to
many people.'8 6 Thus, any time the government tries to justify a
restriction on the ground of offensiveness, the justification is
necessarily improper. A public university, for example, cannot
constitutionally justify a ban on racist speech on the ground that
it expresses a highly offensive idea or that it is very offensive to
the victim groups,187 nor can a city with a large Jewish
ringing doorbells of residents in order to deliver handbills); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308
U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939) (holding unconstitutional an absolute ban on the distribution of
leaflets in public streets or other public places); Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of
N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168-69 (2002) (holding unconstitutional a
municipal ordinance prohibiting persons from engaging in any door-to-door advocacy
unless they obtained a permit prior to doing so and displayed the permit on demand). In
United States v. Alvarez, Justices Breyer and Kagan did not base their conclusion on the
content neutrality analysis of the Kennedy plurality opinion but invoked the narrow
specificity principle to find that the government could advance its legitimate objectives in
less restrictive ways than an absolute prohibition on false statements about receipt of
military medals or decorations. 132 S. Ct. 2542, 2554-56 (2012).
184. See infra Part III.D.5. We will see that this is frequently a basis for invalidating
the challenged regulation of commercial speech. See infra Part III.D.5.
185. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 432-33.
186. As the Supreme Court has stated: "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 397, 414 (1989). In that case, in which the Court held unconstitutional a
state law prohibiting the burning of the American flag, the Court noted that there was no
exception to this principle "even where our flag has been involved." See also Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (applying this principle to the public display of a
jacket containing the "unseemly expletive," "fuck the draft").
187. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 853 (E.D. Mich. 1989). See
also Sedler, supra note 108.
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population, including many Holocaust survivors, ban a march by
self-styled "Nazis" with Nazi uniforms and swastikas.188
In the same vein, the government cannot restrict expression on the
ground that its offensiveness toward the audience to which it is directed
creates a danger of violent reaction against the speaker from the hostile
audience.18 9 In such circumstances, the police have a constitutionally
imposed duty to protect the speaker from the hostile audience.'" The
principle of protection of offensive speech also applies to commercial
speech. 191 Thus, the government cannot prohibit product advertising,
such as an advertisement for contraceptives, on the ground that such
advertising would be offensive to many persons.' 92
The principle of protection of offensive speech means that in
American society, we must tolerate a lot of speech that is highly
offensive to many individuals and groups.'9 3 This is a price that the First
Amendment requires American society to pay. In doing so, all ideas and
expressions are able to enter the marketplace of ideas and compete in the
search for truth, no matter how offensive the expression of those ideas
may be.' 94
4. The Right to Refrain from Speaking
The Court has held that the First Amendment protects the right to
"refrain from speaking." 95 There are two aspects to the First
Amendment "right to refrain from speaking." First, the First Amendment
generally prohibits the government from requiring disclosure of a
person's beliefs or associations. 96 The cases establishing this proposition
arose out of governmental efforts to suppress "subversion" during the
Cold War period and efforts in some southern states to harass
organizations involved in the civil rights movement of the 1960s.'97
Thus, a governmental body investigating "subversion" could not require
188. Sedler, supra note 1, at 471 (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198 (7th Cir.
1978)).
189. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 242 (1963); Terminiello v.
City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 2 (1949).
190. See, e.g., Edwards, 372 U.S. at 242; Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 2.
191. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
192. Id.
193. See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864.
194. See id.
195. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1986).
196. See DeGregory v. Attorney of N.H., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966).
197. See generally id.
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witnesses to testify as to their past membership in allegedly "subversive"
organizations198 or require a civil rights organization to turn over its
membership list to the investigating committee.199 A school board could
not require teachers to list all the organizations to which they belonged or
had contributed money for the preceding five years.2 00 During the Cold
War period, a number of states required teachers and governmental
employees to take loyalty oaths, through which they were required to
swear that they did not belong to any "subversive" organizations and that
they were "loyal" to the United States. The Supreme Court held that all
the loyalty oath requirements violated the First Amendment, 201 except for
an affirmative oath to support the constitutional system of government.202
During this time, the Court dealt with inquiries into the political
beliefs and organizational memberships of applicants for admission to
the bar, which had become a staple of state-required "character and
fitness" investigations.203 The Court held that the First Amendment
precluded the state from inquiring into the applicants' political beliefs
and organizational memberships under the guise of determining
"character and fitness," except for an inquiry into an applicant's knowing
membership in an illegal organization with intent to further the
organization's illegal purpose.20
The Court has also held that the First Amendment does not prevent
the government from requiring political contributors to report their
contributions to or expenditures on behalf of a candidate or requiring
campaign committees to disclose a list of their contributors.205 However,
the Court held that a state law requiring political parties to report the
names of their campaign contributors and recipients of campaign
disbursements could not constitutionally be applied to a minor political
party when the party showed a "reasonable probability" that such
disclosure would subject the contributors to "threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either government officials or private parties."206 In a
recent case, the Court found that such a danger would not necessarily
exist from the public disclosure of petitions supporting a referendum on a
198. Id. at 826.
199. See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 540 (1963).
200. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480 (1960).
201. See, e.g., Keyshian v. Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 591 (1967).
202. See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 677 (1972).
203. See Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S.
154, 156 (1971); Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 2 (1971).
204. See Wadmond, 401 U.S. at 156; Baird, 401 U.S. at 2.
205. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6 (1976).
206. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 93 (1982)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
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state constitutional provision with the names and addresses of its signers,
and so upheld on its face a state law imposing such a requirement.2 07
Second, the "right to refrain from speaking" includes the right not to
be associated with particular ideas. 20 8 This means that the government
cannot force a person to express an idea with which that person
disagrees, which prohibits the government from compelling public
school children to participate in a salute to the American flag209 or
compelling a person to display an automobile license plate containing an
ideological message with which that person disagrees. 2 10 The "right to
refrain from speaking" protects the ability of sponsors of a parade to
exclude from the parade groups expressing ideas with which the sponsors
disagree.21 I For the same reason, the Court has held unconstitutional a
directive of a state regulatory agency that required a public utility to
include in its billing envelopes messages from a group that opposed the
utility's position on utility rates.2 12
The Court has also held that the right not to be associated with
particular ideas is violated when a labor union uses fees imposed by law
on non-union members of the bargaining unit to advance ideological
purposes unrelated to the union's function as the workers' collective
bargaining representative. 2 13 The same is true when the state requires all
207. See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2815 (2010).
208. See Robert A. Sedler, The First Amendment Right to Silence 7 (Wayne St. Univ.
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-39, Nov. 9, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1031505.
209. See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 625 (1943).
210. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706 (1977). In Wooley, the owner of the
vehicle was a Jehovah's Witness who covered up the portion of the state-issued
automobile license plate containing the state's motto, "Live Free or Die," which he
contended was inconsistent with the Jehovah's Witnesses' beliefs in "eternal life." Id. at
709.
211. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 559 (1995). In Hurley, the Court held unconstitutional the application of a state
public accommodations law that would have required a veterans group sponsoring a
parade to permit a gay, lesbian, and bisexual group to march in the parade. Id. at 560-66.
212. Compare Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 4 (1986),
with Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980). In Robins, under state
law, a privately owned shopping center was compelled to allow expressive activities to
take place in the central courtyard of the shopping center, such as the solicitation of
signatures on a petition. Robins, 447 U.S. at 77. The shopping center contended that the
requirement violated its right not to be associated with particular ideas, but the Court
disagreed. Id. The Court found that there was no danger that the public would associate
the shopping center with the expressive activity taking place in the courtyard, so the
requirement did not violate the shopping center's right not to be associated with
particular ideas. Id. at 101.
213. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211 (1977). The non-union
members of the bargaining unit can be charged, of course, for expenses related to the role
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lawyers to pay dues to the state bar association under what is called an
"integrated bar" arrangement; objecting lawyers are entitled to a pro rata
refund of that portion of the compulsory dues that are used by the bar
association for ideological purposes.214
The "right to refrain from speaking" 215 arose in two cases involving
governmentally authorized assessments for generic advertising imposed
on members of an association of agricultural producers.2 16 In one case,
the Court held that the assessment did not violate the "right to refrain
from speaking," because the generic advertisements did not promote any
particular message, but merely urged consumers to buy the agricultural
products.2 17 But in another case, the Court held that a mushroom
marketing scheme, under which a federally established Mushroom
Council could "impose mandatory assessments [on] handlers of fresh
mushrooms for generic advertising to promote mushroom sales,"
violated the "right to refrain from speaking." 2 18 Here, the Court
concluded that the assessment was not germane to the association's
purposes independent of the speech itself and compelled support only for
speech, thereby violating "the right to refrain from speaking." 2 19
of the union as a collective bargaining representative. This includes the costs associated
with activities of state and national union affiliates, including strike preparations (even
though strikes were illegal under state law), but not lobbying expenses. See Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 511 (1990). The non-union members may also be
charged for national litigation expenses so long as the subject matter of the litigation is of
a kind that would be chargeable if the litigation were local and other locals were
reasonably expected to contribute to the costs of the litigation. Id. at 522. The First
Amendment requires that procedures used by the union to collect fees from non-members
must ensure that the non-members have an opportunity to object to and challenge the fees
imposed on them. Specifically, the union must provide an "adequate explanation of the
basis for the fee, a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee
before an impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute
while such challenges are pending." Chicago Teachers Union Local No. I v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292, 310 (1986). The Court has recently held that when a union proposed a special
assessment to use for political purposes, the union was required to send out a notice to all
non-union members of the bargaining unit, giving them an opportunity to object to the
special assessment and providing a full refund of the assessment to the objecting non-
union members. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284 (2012).
214. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
215. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
216. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 408 (2001); Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
217. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471-72.
218. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 408-09,415-16.
219. Id. at 415-16. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, 547
U.S. 47 (2006), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal law that provided that
if any part of a university denied military recruiters access equal to that afforded to other
recruiters (as a number of law schools were doing in order to protest a rule barring openly
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D. Specific First Amendment Doctrines
A number of specific First Amendment doctrines have emerged from
the Supreme Court's decisions in First Amendment cases, reflecting the
Court's efforts to balance the interest in freedom of expression against
other societal interests.220 Some of these doctrines, such as the
overbreadth doctrine, are applicable to any regulation of expression,
while others are designed to deal with the regulation of particular kinds
of expression.22 1 Whenever a specific doctrine is applicable to a
challenged regulation of expression, the application of. that doctrine
determines the constitutionality of the regulation.2 22 We will now discuss
a number of these specific doctrines.
1. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The source of the overbreadth doctrine, sometimes referred to as the
"void on its face" doctrine, is the chilling effect concept.223
To prevent a chilling effect on expression resulting from the
existence and threatened enforcement of overbroad and vague
laws regulating or applicable to acts of expression, such laws
may be challenged on their face for substantial overbreadth or
gay and lesbian persons from serving in the military, the so-called "don't ask, don't tell"
rule), the entire university would be deprived of federal funds. The Court held that the
law did not require the university to support the policy and that the university was free to
oppose the policy, so long as the university did not deny access to military recruiters. Id.
at 58-60. See also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
220-21 (2000) (holding that the "right to refrain from speaking" was not violated by a
university's use of a mandatory student activity fee to provide grants to student
organizations on the basis of viewpoint-neutral criteria). The right to refrain from
speaking is a part of what I have called the "First Amendment Right of Silence." See
Sedler, supra note 208, at 7. The right to silence also includes the right to speak
anonymously without disclosing one's identity and the right to avoid unwanted
communications. Id. Another aspect of the right to silence and the right to refrain from
speaking is the media's editorial discretion. Sedler, supra note 142, at 24. A "media
organization may decide that it is in the public interest . . . to refuse to disclose particular
information ... in its possession ... . When [a media organization] chooses to exercise
[this] editorial discretion[,] ... it has concluded that in the circumstances presented, other
values, such as a concern for an individual's privacy" (reflected in the decision of some
media to refuse to disclose the identity of rape victims), or a concern for national
security, outweigh the public's interest in obtaining that information. Id.
220. Sedler, supra note 1, at 460.
221. Id. at 458-59.
222. See id.
223. Sedler, supra note 34, at 292-93.
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vagueness without regard to whether the activity of the party
challenging the law is itself constitutionally protected.2 24
The overbreadth doctrine is very important in practice, not only
because it permits a law to be invalidated on its face without regard to
whether the activity of the party challenging the law is itself
constitutionally protected,22 5 but because the constitutional analysis does
not go beyond the terms of the law itself.22 6 Moreover, once a law is held
void on its face for overbreadth, the law literally ceases to exist: it cannot
be enforced against any person in any circumstance.227 In applying the
overbreadth doctrine, a court must look to the terms of the law and must
determine whether the law includes, or reasonably could be interpreted to
228include, a substantial amount of protected expression. The more
sweeping the terms of the law, the more likely it is to include within its
prohibitions protected expression, and the more likely it is to be found
void on its face for overbreadth.229
Applying the overbreadth doctrine, "the Court has struck down, for
example, a law imposing an absolute ban on peaceful picketing, 230 a law
making it unlawful for a person to 'in any manner oppose, molest, abuse
or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty,"' 2 3 1 a law making
it unlawful to "advocate crime or methods of terrorism," 232 and "a law
forbidding the use of 'opprobrious words or abusive language tending to
cause a breach of the peace." 233 The Court has also struck down "a law
224. Id. at 292.
225. The overbreadth doctrine is sometimes explained as an exception to the rule
against third party standing. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-612
(1973). I have maintained that it is more properly explained in substantive terms. A party
has a substantive First Amendment right, grounded in a concern for preventing a chilling
effect on expression, not to be subject to sanction under a law that is "void on its face"
for overbreadth. See Robert A. Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A
Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1308, 1326-27 (1982). Where a party is not
subject to sanction under a challenged law, the party cannot assert an overbreadth
challenge on the ground that the law violates the First Amendment rights of third parties.
See L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 38-41 (1999)
(holding that a party who wanted to obtain governmental information for purposes not
authorized by statute could not assert facial challenge to statutory requirements).
226. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12.
227. See id. at 613.
228. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010).
229. Sedler, supra note 34, at 292.
230. Id. (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 91 (1940)).
231. Id. (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987)).
232. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969).
233. Sedler, supra note 34, at 292 (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518-19
(1972)).
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forbidding individuals to 'assemble on the sidewalk and conduct
themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by,' 2 34 a federal law
banning 'indecent' interstate commercial telephone messages,"2 35 and
recently, a federal law criminalizing the commercial creation, sale, or
possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty. 23 6
The one qualification of the overbreadth doctrine is that it will not be
applied to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of substantial
overbreadth. The overbreadth must be "real and substantial in relation to
the law's plainly legitimate sweep." 237 In other words, where the
regulatory provisions of the law are clearly constitutional, the law will
not be invalidated on its face merely because it is possible to hypothesize
some possible unconstitutional applications.238 With this qualification,
the overbreadth doctrine is very important in practice because it can be
invoked to challenge on its face a law regulating or applying to acts of
expression.
234. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 611-13, 616 (1971).
235. Sedler, supra note 34, at 292 (citing Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 117 (1989)).
236. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
237. Sedler, supra note 108, at 653 n.94 (citing City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S.
451,460-65 (1987)).
238. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (stating that to survive an overbreadth challenge, one
must establish that no circumstances exist under which the statute would be valid). The
Court first pronounced the substantial overbreadth qualification in Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
601. That case involved a challenge to a state law prohibiting partisan political activity on
the part of state civil service employees. Id. The Court upheld the law on the ground that
partisan political activity on the part of state civil service employees could interfere with
the impartial and efficient operation of the civil service. Id. at 616. The Court emphasized
that the ban on such activity did not interfere with the ability of civil service employees to
express political views outside the context of a partisan political campaign. Id. at 616-17.
The civil employees challenging the law, who had engaged in soliciting contributions
from their subordinates, argued that the law could be interpreted as applying to activities
such as wearing campaign buttons or placing campaign signs on the bumpers of their
automobiles. Id. at 609-10. The Court said that if the law ever was applied to such
activities, it could be challenged as unconstitutional as applied, but this possible
overbreadth was not substantial in relation to the law's plainly legitimate sweep. Id. at
618. See also Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 115, 124 (2003). In Hicks, the Court
upheld a municipal law which forbade the public from using streets adjacent to a
municipal housing development for low-income residents in an effort to combat rampant
crime and drug dealing there. Id. at 124. The Court rejected an overbreadth challenge to
the law despite the possibility that it could be applied to bar a person seeking to come to
the housing development for expressive purposes. Id. at 123-24. Similarly, in Los Angeles
Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing Co., 528 U.S. 32, 34, 38 (1999), the
Court held that a facial challenge could not be made to a state law requiring that a person
requesting an addressee's address declare that the request was "made for one of five
prescribed purposes" and that the address would "not be used directly or indirectly to sell
a product or service."
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2. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
Any effort by the government to obtain an injunction or
otherwise to impose an advance prohibition against expression
brings into play the prior restraint doctrine. Since a prior restraint
directly interferes with the ability of the public to receive the
information, it creates a "freezing effect" on expression. Thus, a
prior restraint is presumptively unconstitutional and requires a
very heavy burden of justification on the part of the
government.239 Applying the prior restraint doctrine, the
Supreme Court has held that the United States government could
not obtain an injunction against the publication of the "Pentagon
Papers," a series of secret governmental documents detailing the
events that led up to American military involvement in Vietnam,
239. In the "classic" prior restraint case, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701, 706,
722-23 (1931), the Court applied the prior restraint doctrine to hold violative of the First
Amendment a state law providing for the abatement as a nuisance of a "malicious,
scandalous and defamatory newspaper" and a resulting injunction against a newspaper
enjoining it from publishing or circulating "any publication whatsoever which is a
malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper." Many years later, the Court again
applied the prior restraint doctrine to hold unconstitutional another state public nuisance
law authorizing injunctions against the "habitual use of the . . . premises for commercial
exhibition of obscene material." Vance v. Univ. Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317, 321
(1980). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 61-63, 69-71 (1963)
(holding unconstitutional as an "informal" prior restraint a state's use of a governmental
commission that would identify "objectionable" books, notify the distributor of the
commission's duty to recommend obscenity prosecutions to the Attorney General, and
distribute the commission's list of "objectionable" books to the local police departments,
which usually visited the distributor to determine what action had been taken).
The prior restraint doctrine does not preclude the issuance of an injunction against
illegal activity carried out by means of language, such as a newspaper's engaging in an
action of discrimination by running sex-based "help wanted" ads. See Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 380-81, 389 (1973).
Likewise, an adult bookstore may not be used as a place for prostitution. See Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986). See also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 438-39, 445 (1957) (upholding an injunction against a publication that the
court determined to be obscene in an adversary proceeding).
The prior restraint doctrine precludes the issuance of an ex parte injunction
against any activity involving expression, such as a planned demonstration, and it does
not matter whether the injunction could have been justified following such a hearing.
Carroll v. President & Comm'n of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1968).
However, once an injunction against expression has been issued, whether or not in
violation of the First Amendment, the party subject to the injunction must take action to
have the injunction set aside on appeal and cannot violate the injunction. Walker v. City
of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1967). The First Amendment does not require the
invalidity of the injunction to provide a defense to a contempt proceeding for its
violation. Id. at 318 n.11.
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which had been illegally disclosed to the press by disaffected
governmental officials. 240 The Court has also held that under the
prior restraint doctrine, injunctions against the media prohibiting
the publication of facts connected with criminal prosecutions,
and issued for the purpose of preventing "prejudicial publicity"
against the accused, are generally unconstitutional.24 1
Any system of governmental licensing of expression
analytically involves a prior restraint, and the Court has dealt
with governmental licensing of expression by imposing specific
requirements on any form of licensing. As a general proposition,
any law licensing expression must be content[-]neutral and must
contain narrow, objective, and definite standards control the
discretion of the licensing official. If the law fails to contain such
standards, it is invalidated on its face, and a party subject to the
law is not required to apply for a license as a condition to
challenging its constitutionality. 2 42
240. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). There, the Court
refused to recognize a so-called "national security" exception to the prior restraint
doctrine, and, in that particular case, the United States could not sustain the heavy burden
of justification required under the doctrine. Id. The heavy burden of justification might be
sustained in a case where the government seeks an injunction against a publication that
would disclose the names of Central Intelligence Agency agents engaged in covert
activities in foreign countries. C.f Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 280 (1981) (upholding a
First Amendment challenge to the revocation of the passport of an American citizen and
former Central Intelligence Agency employee who had announced his intention to
"expose CIA officers and drive them out of the countries where they [were] operating").
241. Sedler, supra note 34, at 293. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541,
570 (1976).
242. Sedler, supra note 34, at 293-94. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610,
620-23 (1976); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322-24 (1958); Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-52 (1938). However, if the licensing law is valid on its face,
the party seeking the license must apply for a license before being able to challenge the
constitutionality of the law as applied to deny the license in the particular case. Poulos v.
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 408-14 (1953). See also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y
v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 154-56 (2002). In Watchtower Bible, the Court held
unconstitutional a. municipal law that required individuals to obtain a permit prior to
engaging in door-to-door advocacy and to display on demand the permit containing the
individual's name. Id. The Court found that the law was not narrowly tailored to
advancing the asserted interests of "protecting [the] privacy [of the residents] and
preventing fraud and crime." Id. at 168-69.
The licensing of expression involving access to public property, such as that
reflected in parade permit laws, will be discussed subsequently. See discussion infra Part
Ill.D.7. As discussed below, the constitutional requirements for such licensing laws are
the same as those for laws licensing expression generally. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v.
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The First Amendment also imposes procedural requirements on
governmental efforts to enjoin the publication of unprotected speech,
such as obscenity, and on the operation of licensing systems.243 These
requirements are designed to ensure that an injunction will not be issued
against protected expression and that expression will not be delayed or
"chilled" due to a licensing requirement. Therefore, if a state seeks to
enjoin the publication of a work or the distribution of a film on the
ground that it is "obscene," the state must initiate a judicial proceeding
during which the alleged "obscenity" of the work or film will be
expeditiously determined. It is only after the judicial determination of the
"obscenity" of the work or film in an adversarial proceeding that an
injunction can be issued against its publication or distribution.244
Likewise, laws requiring the licensing of charitable solicitors must
provide that if the license is not issued within a specified (brief) period of
time, the government will initiate a judicial proceeding to seek a
determination that the applicant does not meet the constitutionally
permissible licensing criteria.24 5
3. The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
As discussed previously, the primary context in which the "Law of
the First Amendment" developed for many years was in response to
governmental repression of dissent and the expression of unpopular
ideas.246 The Supreme Court very early promulgated the "clear and
present danger" test as the basis for determining when the government
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-60 (1975) (holding that when the government establishes
standards for access to a particular public forum, it must follow the Freedman
procedures) (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965)).
243. See, e.g., Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
244. See id.; Kingsley Books, 354 U.S at 436, 442. The Freedman procedures were
held to apply to postal refusals to deliver and customs seizures. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410, 417 (1971); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 374-75
(1971). Laws dealing with the licensing of adult entertainment businesses must require
the government to decide whether to issue a license "within a reasonable period of time"
and must provide for expeditious judicial review of a refusal to issue a license, but the
law may require that the applicant institute the proceeding for judicial review. FWIPBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 228-30 (1990). In City of Littleton v. ZJ. Gifts D-4,
L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 781-82 (2004), the Court held that the state's ordinary judicial
review procedures would suffice to assure prompt judicial access and a prompt judicial
decision, as long as the state courts remained sensitive to the need to prevent First
Amendment harms. The Court upheld the facial validity of an adult entertainment
licensing law that provided that the final licensing decision could be appealed to a state
court pursuant to the state's civil procedure rules. Id. at 776, 784.
245. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 802 (1988).
246. See supra notes 77-96 and accompanying text.
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could constitutionally prohibit advocacy of unlawful action, such as the
violent overthrow of the government.247 While the Court's application of
this test was not always consistent, especially during the early Cold War
period when the Court applied the test rather loosely to sustain the
constitutionality of laws directed against the Communist Party, 248 the
Court many years ago reformulated the test to provide strong
constitutional protection for advocacy of unlawful action. Under the
current formulation of the "clear and present danger" test, advocacy of
unlawful action is constitutionally protected "except where such
advocacy is directed toward inciting imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."249 This formulation effectively
protects virtually any expression directed toward dissent and social
change efforts despite the government's claim that the expression
advocates unlawful action.250 The Court has also long applied the "clear
and present danger" test to efforts by judges to punish individual or
media criticism as contempt of court and has found all such efforts to be
unconstitutional.251
4. The New York Times Rule
The New York Times rule, promulgated in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,2 52 is derived from the "chilling effect" concept, and imposes
stringent requirements in defamation and other personal tort actions
brought by public officials and public figures. In order to avoid a
"chilling effect" on the discussion of issues of public interest, the New
York Times rule mandates there can be no recovery for false statements
of fact about public officials or public figures, unless the plaintiff can
prove with "convincing clarity" that the statement was knowingly false
or was made with "reckless disregard" for its truth or falsity.253 The New
247. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 77-83.
249. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. Because the challenged state "Criminal
Syndicalism Act," which traced back to the "red scare" period of the 1920s, made it
unlawful to advocate crime or methods of terrorism, it was void on its face for
overbreadth. See id. at 444-45, 447-49.
250. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106, 108 (1973) (finding that threats of
violence made by university students during an anti-war demonstration did not reach the
point of being "likely to incite or produce [imminent lawless] action").
251. Sedler, supra note 34, at 294-95. The Court has said that the criticism must be of
such a nature as to present an extremely high danger of an actual obstruction of the
administration ofjustice; it has never found this rigorous test satisfied. See, e.g., Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386-88 (1962); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336 (1946).
252. 376 U.S. 254, 268-73, 279-80 (1964).
253. Id. at 279-80, 285-86.
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York Times rule also applies to actions for invasion of privacy and for the
infliction of emotional distress.254 Moreover, the rule imposes certain
limitations on defamation actions brought by private figure plaintiffs
against newspapers when the newspaper has "publishe[d] speech of
public concern." 255 In such a case, the plaintiff must prove the falsity of
the statements at issue,256 and there can be no award of punitive damages
unless the test of "knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth" has
been satisfied.257 In an extension of the New York Times rule, the Court
has held that the federal wiretap law, prohibiting the illegal interception
of telephone communications, could not constitutionally be applied to
impose liability against a newspaper for broadcasting an illegally
intercepted communication concerning a matter of public concern,
notwithstanding that the newspaper had reason to know that the
communication had been illegally intercepted.258
It may be assumed that most media organizations have established
internal procedures to ensure that they will not disseminate any
information that could be shown to be "knowingly false" or made with
"reckless disregard" for its truth or falsity. As a practical matter, the New
York Times rule has served to insulate media organizations from liability
for defamation and has reflected the Court's determination that the public
interest in the widespread dissemination of information about matters of
public concern outweighs the resulting harm to individual reputational
and privacy interests.
5. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
For constitutional purposes, commercial speech refers to speech
involving the exchange of goods or services for a profit, such as product
254. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 386-88 (1967).
255. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986).
256. Id. at 776.
257. Sedler, supra note 34, at 296. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 377
(1974) (White, J., dissenting). In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 42-45 (1971),
a three-justice plurality would have fully extended the New York Times rule to any
defamatory statement involving matters of public interest. To a large extent, this
objective is achieved by the holding in Gertz. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 751-52, 757-61, 763 (1985), a highly fragmented Court held
that when the defamatory statements did not involve a matter of public concern, such as a
false report to subscribers of a credit reporting agency concerning a contractor's
bankruptcy, the New York Times rule did not apply, and the state court could award actual
and punitive damages without a showing of "knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth."
258. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517-18 (2001).
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advertising, which is distinct from speech involving the production or
exchange of ideas. 2 59 The Court has promulgated the commercial speech
doctrine to determine the constitutional permissibility of governmental
regulation of commercial speech. 260 The application of the commercial
speech doctrine, referred to as the Central Hudson test, requires a four-
part analysis.2 6 ' First, the commercial speech "must concern lawful
activity and [must] not be misleading."2 6 2 Assuming that the commercial
speech in question meets this requirement, courts must evaluate three
factors to determine the constitutionality of the particular commercial
speech regulation: (1) the governmental interest asserted to justify the
regulation must be substantial; (2) the regulation must directly advance
259. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 561-64 (1980).
260. See id. at 566.
261. Id.
262. Id. An advertisement for illegal activity constitutes an unprotected "verbal act."
See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Under this element of the commercial speech
doctrine, the First Amendment does not preclude governmental regulation of false or
misleading advertising. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64. The justification for this
restriction is that the truth of an advertisement is more readily verifiable than the truth of
non-commercial speech. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). In any event, the advertiser must advertise the product
and so will not be "chilled" by this restriction. Id. For the same reason, when an
advertisement is false or misleading, the government may require the advertiser to retract
the false or misleading information and make disclaimers in future advertisements. See,
e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985). This is one
example of the Court's oft-repeated statement that commercial speech receives less
constitutional protection than non-commercial speech. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S.
at 562-63. Under this component of the commercial speech doctrine, the government may
impose disclosure requirements that are reasonably related to the government's interest in
preventing deception of consumers. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 (requiring advertising
lawyers operating on a contingent-fee basis-under which the lawyer receives no fee
unless the suit is successful-to disclose in the advertisement that the client would be
liable for court costs if the suit were unsuccessful); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1330 (2010) (requiring that "debt relief agencies," which
include lawyers who provide advice with respect to "debt relief," disclose in any
advertisement directed to the general public that they "are a debt relief agency [that]
help[s] people file for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code" and that the debt relief
agency "provides assistance with respect to credit defaults, mortgage foreclosures,
eviction proceedings, excessive debt, debt collection pressure, or inability to pay any
consumer debt"). It may be noted that requirements that advertisers retract false or
misleading information and that they make disclaimers or disclosures advance the public
information function of the First Amendment by providing additional and relevant
information to consumers. Id. at 1339-40.
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the asserted governmental interest; and (3) the regulation may not be
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.2 6 3
Applying the commercial speech doctrine, the Court has invalidated
a number of restrictions on commercial speech, such as bans on
advertising by lawyers and other professionals, 264 bans on promotional
advertising by regulated public utilities,265 bans on advertising
contraceptives, 266 bans on placing "for sale" signs on the lawns of private
homes, 2 67 bans on displaying the alcoholic content of beverages on
product label,268 bans on advertising the retail price of alcoholic
263. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-66. The "no more extensive than is necessary"
element incorporates, to an extent, the narrow specificity principle into the commercial
speech doctrine. Id. at 570.
264. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749 (invalidating a ban on
pharmacists' advertisement of prices of prescription drugs); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz.,
433 U.S. 350, 354-55 (1977) (invalidating an absolute ban on lawyer advertising);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 761 (1993) (invalidating a ban on certified public
accountants' direct, in-person solicitation of prospective business clients). The state may,
however, prohibit lawyers from engaging in direct, in-person solicitation of prospective
clients for remunerative employment, although not for the purpose of litigating "public
interest" issues without any compensation to the lawyer. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 412-13 (1978). The
justification for the ban on a lawyer's in-person solicitation of prospective clients for
remunerative employment is that it is necessary as a "prophylactic rule" because of the
inherent danger of overreaching in direct solicitation by lawyers. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at
467. This danger is considered absent when a lawyer is soliciting clients to litigate
"public interest" issues, usually on behalf of a "public interest" organization, or when a
certified public accountant is soliciting business clients for accounting services. See, e.g.,
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 421; Edenfeld, 507 U.S. at 775-777. The state must generally
permit targeted direct mail solicitation of clients for remunerative employment. See
Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 466-67 (1988). However, the state may prohibit
targeted direct-mail solicitations by personal injury lawyers to accident victims and their
relatives for thirty days following an accident. Fla. Bar v. Went-for-It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
618 (1995). With that exception, states may not otherwise prohibit lawyer advertising
containing truthful information. See lbanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512
U.S. 136, 136-37 (1994) (invalidating a board's reprimand of a lawyer for referencing her
credentials as a certified public accountant and certified financial planner in advertising);
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 91 (1990) (allowing
an attorney to advertise a certification as a specialist received from a national
organization). The state may not prohibit newspaper advertisements advising persons of a
pending class action and soliciting their participation in the class action. Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 626-27.
265. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561.
266. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61. The government's
attempt to justify the ban on the ground that such advertising would be offensive to many
persons conflicted with the principle of the protection of offensive speech. Id. at 73.
267. Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85, 86, 98 (1977).
268. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995).
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beverages,2 69 location prohibitions and point-of-sale restrictions on
tobacco advertising directed at children,27 0 and a provision of a federal
regulation that exempted certain drugs from standard Federal Drug
Administration approval requirements, on condition that the providers
refrain from advertising or promoting these drugs. 27 1
However, in some cases, the Court--emphasizing that commercial
speech does not receive as much protection as non-commercial speech-
272has upheld challenged regulations under the Central Hudson test.
These have included a ban on commercial billboards to advance
269. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996). In Liquormart, the
Court clarified that the Twenty-First Amendment, which gives states plenary authority
over the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages, did not qualify the First
Amendment. Id. Thus, the state regulation of speech-connected alcoholic beverages could
be challenged as violative of the First Amendment. Id.
270. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565-66 (2001). The state law
prohibited any outdoor advertising of tobacco products that was directed toward or
visible in any location within a "1,000 foot radius of any public playground, playground
area in a public park, elementary school or secondary school." Id. at 534-35 (quoting 940
MASS. CODE REGs § 21.04(5)(a)(2001)). The law also regulated advertising in retail
stores selling tobacco and located within a 1,000-foot radius of playgrounds and schools
by requiring that point-of-sale advertising be placed at least five feet above the floor. Id.
at 535. The Court held that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
preempted the law with respect to cigarette advertising and then considered whether the
law violated the First Amendment as applied to the advertising of cigars and smokeless
tobacco. Id. at 550-51 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (West 2000)). Applying the
commercial speech doctrine, a Court majority held that the prohibition of outdoor
advertising was more restrictive than necessary to advance the state's interest in
preventing underage tobacco use, and that the regulation of on-site advertising did not
directly advance the asserted interest in preventing underage tobacco use, as it was "more
extensive than necessary" to advance this interest. Id. at 561-67.
271. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360, 376-77 (2002). Again, the
Court found that the regulation was "more extensive than necessary" to advance the
state's asserted interest in preventing large-scale manufacturing of drugs that had been
exempted from the standard drug approval requirements. See id. at 368, 370-72 (quoting
Robin, 514 U.S. at 491). In Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011),
after holding that a Vermont law prohibiting pharmacies from selling or disclosing
pharmacy records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors was
unconstitutional under the content neutrality principle, the Court addressed the state's
argument that a lesser standard of scrutiny should apply because the speech at issue was
commercial speech. The Court found it unnecessary to decide this question, because even
if it was commercial speech, under the commercial speech doctrine, the state could not
have a substantial interest in suppressing a disfavored message. Id. at 2668. Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented on the ground that any effect on expression was
"inextricably related to a lawful governmental effort to regulate a commercial enterprise"
and that the regulation could be upheld under the commercial speech doctrine. Id. at
2673-84.
272. See infra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
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governmental interests in aesthetics and traffic safety2 73 and a public
university's ban on sales presentations in student residences.274 The
Court has also held that, at least in some circumstances, the government
may limit advertising of the availability of activities that are illegal in
275
some states. It has also been assumed that the First Amendment does
not prevent the government from requiring that commercial advertising
contain additional information, such as the "cigarette smoking is harmful
to your health" warning that the federal government requires on all
276
cigarette advertising.
273. Compare Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 503 (1981)
(recognizing an exception to the category neutrality aspect of the content neutrality
principle and holding that the government could exempt some commercial billboards
from the regulation, but not some non-commercial billboards from the regulation), with
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 410-11 (1993) (holding that
a city could not exclude newsracks containing advertising and promotional materials on
public sidewalks if it permitted newsracks containing newspapers, as there was no valid
basis for distinguishing between newsracks in terms of the content of the material
contained in the newsrack).
274. See Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 472, 480-81, 85-86 (1989).
275. See FCC v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 436 (1993) (upholding a federal law
prohibiting the broadcasting of lottery advertisements in states where lotteries were
illegal). A large number of states have state-sponsored lotteries, but some do not, and the
effect of the law in Edge Broadcasting Company was to prohibit advertising of such
lotteries in a neighboring state where lotteries were illegal. Id. However, in Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Association, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 180-81 (1999),
the Court held that the law was unconstitutional as applied to prohibit the broadcasting of
advertisements for casino gambling in states where casino gambling was legal,
notwithstanding that the broadcast signals could, under certain conditions, be heard in
neighboring states where casino gambling was illegal. One of the justifications the
government asserted for the ban was to discourage public participation in casino
gambling in order to minimize the social ills that have been historically associated with
this activity. Id. at 181-82. The Court found, however, that the ban did not "substantially
advance" that interest because of the inconsistencies and exceptions contained in the law,
including an exception for advertising by gambling casinos operated by Indian tribes in
accordance with a detailed federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 189-90. The Court also found
that the regulation was "more extensive than necessary to serve the [asserted] interest."
Id. at 188-89 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 557 (1980)). In Posadas de P.R. Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328,
345-46 (1986), the Court in a 5-4 decision held that Puerto Rico could prohibit casino
gambling under a "greater includes the lesser" analysis: since Puerto Rico could
constitutionally prohibit casino gambling, it could also prohibit advertising about casino
gambling. In Liquormart, the Court stated that "Posadas erroneously performed a First
Amendment analysis," and Posadas is effectively overruled. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509-10 (1977).
276. See Federal Cigarette Labeling & Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1341
(West 2012). Again, this requirement provides additional information to consumers and
so advances the public information function of the First Amendment by providing
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The commercial speech doctrine is very important in practice, and
one may expect cases involving the application of the commercial speech
doctrine to continue to come before the Court. Business entities have
used the doctrine with considerable success to challenge restrictions on
advertising and regulatory laws that reach commercial speech.277 In
addition, while the Court has emphasized that commercial speech does
not receive as much protection as non-commercial speech, it has
nonetheless invalidated a number of restrictions under the commercial
speech doctrine. 27 8 This result will encourage business entities to
continue to try to use the commercial speech doctrine to challenge
governmental regulation of their activities.279
6. The Symbolic Speech Doctrine
The constitutionality of governmental regulation of activity
that combines speech and non-speech elements [is evaluated]
under the symbolic speech doctrine. Under this doctrine, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
non-speech elements of the activity may justify incidental
restrictions on expression.2 80 In order to be sustained, the
challenged regulation must satisfy four requirements: (1) the
information to smokers about the harmful effect of cigarette smoking. See Sedler, supra
note 34, at 297.
277. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).
278. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,481-83 (1995).
279. Older cases decided before the Court that have promulgated the commercial
speech doctrine have upheld certain bans on commercial speech, such as bans on
advertising on the sides of delivery vehicles. See Ry. Express Agency Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 107-08, 111 (1949). Bans on the distribution of advertising leaflets in the
public streets were also upheld. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
In addition, while bans on door-to-door solicitation using non-commercial speech were
held unconstitutional, bans on door-to-door commercial solicitation were assumed to be
unconstitutional. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943). Today, the
constitutionality of such restrictions on commercial speech would be evaluated under the
commercial speech doctrine, and they would not be as readily upheld. For different views
as to the extent and bases of First Amendment protection for commercial speech,
compare Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 67 (2007), with Charles
Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
663 (2008). See also Shiffrin, supra note 8, for a comprehensive discussion of First
Amendment methodology and commercial speech.
280. The symbolic speech doctrine was first promulgated in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 383 (1968). See Eugene Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the
Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 1057, 1059 (2009), for a
submission that the historic context of the First Amendment-originalism--demonstrates
that the Framers intended symbolic expression to be the equivalent of verbal expression.
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regulation must be within the constitutional power of the
government; (2) the regulation must further a substantial
governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 2 8 1 and (4) the
"incidental" restriction on expression must be no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 28 2
Applying the symbolic speech doctrine, the Court has upheld a
Congressional ban on the destruction of 'draft registration' cards, which
men subject to the military draft were required to carry in their
possession,283 but has held that a public high school could not
constitutionally prohibit "a student from wearing a black armband to
school to protest the Vietnam War." 28 4 "Although many cases may
involve 'symbolic speech' in the sense that the activity at issue combines
'speech' and 'non-speech' elements," relatively few cases and no recent
ones have seen the Court actually invoke the symbolic speech doctrine to
resolve the constitutional issue presented in the particular case.2 85 It may
be that, in practice, the Court is likely to invoke the symbolic speech
doctrine only when the government specifically asserts an interest in
regulating the "non-speech" element of the activity, as it did with respect
to the destruction of "draft registration" cards.
7. The Public Forum Doctrine
The public forum doctrine determines the constitutional
permissibility of governmental regulation of "expression that takes place
on, or seeks access to, public property."2 86 Precisely because public
property is involved, the government may, consistent with the First
Amendment, impose some restrictions on the expression that takes place
on public property that would not be permissible in other contexts, and it
281. This requirement incorporates the viewpoint neutrality aspect of the content
neutrality principle into the symbolic speech doctrine. In the flag burning cases, United
States v. Eichman and Texas v. Johnson, the Court found that the ban was directed to the
content of the message conveyed by the burning. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310,
311 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989). Thus, the ban violated the
content neutrality principle and likewise failed the third requirement of the symbolic
speech doctrine. See supra notes 147, 157 and accompanying text.
282. Sedler, supra note 34, at 300. This requirement incorporates the narrow
specificity principle. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
283. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 386.
284. Sedler, supra note 34, at 300; Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504,
514 (1969).
285. Sedler, supra note 34, at 300.
286. Id. at 316.
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may sometimes deny or limit access to public property for expressive
purposes.
The public forum doctrine and the doctrine of reasonable
time, place and manner regulation interact with each other to
determine the constitutional permissibility of governmental
regulation of expression that takes place on, or seeks access to,
public property.
Under the public forum doctrine, the permissible scope of
regulation or restriction of expression that takes place on, or
seeks access to, public property depends on whether or not the
public property in question constitutes a public forum. If the
public property constitutes a public forum, there must be
universal access to that property for purposes of expression by
all persons and groups, subject only to reasonable time, place
and manner regulations. . . . [Universal access is not required]
[w]ith respect to public property that is not a public forum, [and]
the permissibility of any restriction on access to or use of such
property for expressive purposes is determined under a general
"reasonableness" test. The government may "reserve the
[property] for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker's views." 287 This means that the
government may constitutionally impose category-type
restrictions on such access [to public property that does not
constitute a public forum] so long as the particular category-type
restriction is reasonably related to the purpose for which the
property is being used.288
287. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Greensburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 133 n.7 (1981)).
288. Sedler, supra note 34, at 316. In Perry, the Court held that a school district could
limit access to the interschool mail system to the exclusive bargaining representative of
its teachers. 460 U.S. at 50-51, 55. To this extent, the category neutrality aspect of the
content neutrality principle does not apply unreservedly to access to public property that
does not constitute a public forum. See id. at 48-49. However, the category neutrality
aspect of the principle does apply to invalidate a category-type restriction that is not
reasonably related to the purpose for which the property is being used. See Police Dep't
of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). In Mosley, a municipal law prohibited
picketing within 150 feet of a school building while the school was in session. Id. at 92.
Such a restriction would be upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation,
even as applied to the sidewalk adjoining the school, a public forum, as a reasonable
restriction on access to the school grounds, which are not a public forum. See id. at 98-99.
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The public streets and parks are traditional public forums,
which "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the
public and time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions."289 Any other public property may
be designated as a public forum by the government's opening it
up for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. 2 90
Where the public property in question is either a traditional or
designated public forum, the government cannot deny access to
or prohibit expression on the property, but can only impose
reasonable and content neutral regulations with respect to the
time, place, and manner in which expression occurs on the
291property. In order for a particular regulation to be sustained as
a reasonable time, place[,] and manner regulation, it must (1)
But the law here contained an exception for "the peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute." Id. at 93. This category distinction was not related to the
purpose for which the property in question was being used, since picketing in connection
with a labor dispute would disrupt the functioning of the school in the same manner as
any other picketing. Id. at 100. Thus, the law violated the category neutrality aspect of the
content neutrality principle and was unconstitutional. Id. The viewpoint neutrality aspect
of the content neutrality principle applies fully to the non-public forum as well as to the
public forum, so any viewpoint-based restriction would be unconstitutional. See Perry,
460 U.S. at 45-46. See also Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99. This is the meaning of the "[no]
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view"
language in Perry. 460 U.S. at 46.
289. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
290. The government may designate a public forum for a limited purpose, such as for
use by certain groups. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981)
(designating facilities of a state university available for use by student groups); City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp't Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174-76
(1976) (opening school board meetings to the public).
291. As the regulation must be content-neutral, a public university's attempt to exclude
a student group wishing to use the facilities for religious worship and discussion was held
unconstitutional in Widmar. 454 U.S. at 267. In Madison, the school board could not
constitutionally deny a non-union teacher the opportunity to speak on pending labor
negotiations at a school board meeting. 429 U.S. at 174-76. See also Lamb's Chapel v.
Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386-92 (1993) (holding that when a
school district permitted after-hours use of school facilities for "social, civic, [and]
recreational purposes" by private organizations, it could not prohibit a private
organization seeking to show a religious film).
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serve a significant governmental interest,292 and (2) leave open
ample alternative channels for communication.293
The application of the reasonable time, place[,] and manner
regulation doctrine may be illustrated by ... [considering a case]
where the Court upheld a regulation requiring that the sale or
distribution of merchandise, including written materials, at a
state fair take place only from a booth on the fairground, and not
on the fairground itself.29 4 Any person or group wishing to sell
merchandise or materials could rent a booth on a first-come,
first-served basis with the rental charge based on the size and
location of the booth.29 5 [In upholding the rule,] [t]he Court
emphasized the state's interest in maintaining crowd movement
within the relatively small area of the fairground, and noted that
a fairground presented crowd control problems that were absent
on a city street. The Court also emphasized that the rule did not
prohibit any expression on the fairground other than that
involving sale or distribution. Thus, the Court concluded the rule
served a significant governmental interest while leaving open
ample alternative channels of communication.296
The Court has been disposed to uphold most restrictions on
expression in the public forum on the ground that [the particular
restriction can be brought within the ambit of the reasonable
time, place, and manner regulation doctrine]. . . 297 The Court
has upheld as a reasonable time, place and manner regulation a
law prohibiting the congregation of persons within 500 feet of a
foreign embassy "when the police reasonably believe that such
congregation poses a threat to the security or peace of the
292. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). See
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-62 (1939) (holding that a city's interest in
preventing littering was not of sufficient importance to justify a ban on distributing
leaflets on public streets).
293. Sedler, supra note 34, at 317. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. See also Schneider v.
Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
294. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 646-56
(1981).
295. Id. at 644.
296. Sedler, supra note 34, at 317-18. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 644. If the state had
tried to advance the interest in maintaining crowd control by prohibiting any crowd
mingling not involving sale or distribution, or had not provided the booths on a first-
come, first-served basis and at a reasonable cost, the rule would not have been found
"reasonable" and so would have been constitutionally invalid. Id. at 647-48.
297. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988).
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embassy," 2 98 a law prohibiting voter solicitation and the display
or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the
voting place,29 9 [a ban on "focused picketing" in front of a
person's home, 3 ] a rule of the federal park service prohibiting
overnight sleeping in a small public park near the White House,
as applied to prohibit "tenting" in connection with a
demonstration intended to call attention to the plight of the
homeless, 30 1 an "anti-noise" regulation prohibiting the making of
"any noise or diversion on school grounds while school is in
session which tends to disturb the peace or good order of such
school session," as applied to a public sidewalk adjacent to the
school,302 and a municipal noise regulation requiring that musical
performances in a band shell in a public park make use of the
sound system and sound technician provided by the city.30 3
However, the Court has held unconstitutional[,] [as an
unreasonable restriction,] a law prohibiting all displays and
leafleting on a sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court
building.304
298. Id.
299. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-211 (1992).
300. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476-88 (1988). In that case, in response to
picketing by anti-abortion protestors in front of the home of a physician who performed
abortions, a city enacted a law that prohibited .'engag[ing] in picketing before or about
the residence or dwelling of any individual."' Id. at 477. The Court gave the law a
narrowing construction, so as to limit it to "focused picketing" directed at a particular
residence. Id. at 482-83. As narrowed, the law did not reach walking through residential
neighborhoods or "even walking a route in front of an entire block of houses." Id. Thus,
the law would advance the asserted interest in promoting residential privacy without
substantially interfering with the ability of the protestors to convey their message to the
general public and even to the target of their protest. Id. at 484-87. Thus, the law was
valid as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at 476-88. In Madsen v.
Women's Health Center, the Court held unconstitutional an injunction creating a 300-foot
buffer zone around the homes of those who worked in an abortion clinic. 512 U.S. 753,
773-76 (1994). The Court noted that the zone around the residence was much larger than
the zone approved in Frisby and that a "limitation on the time, duration of picketing, and
number of pickets outside a smaller zone" would advance the asserted interest in
protecting the privacy of the patients and physicians. Id. at 775.
301. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289-98 (1984).
302. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1972).
303. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 783-90 (1989).
304. Sedler, supra note 34, at 318-19. Compare United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171
(1983), with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 560-64 (1964) (upholding a ban on
picketing in or near a courthouse "with the intent of interfering with, obstructing or
impeding the administration of justice"). While the reasonable time, place, and manner
doctrine has developed primarily to determine the constitutionality of regulations
governing access to a public forum, it is potentially applicable in other contexts. See, e.g.,
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In a number of cases, the Court has dealt with the constitutionality of
restrictions on picketing and demonstrations in front of anti-abortion
clinics.30 s In these cases, the Court has tried to balance the right of
abortion opponents to express their strong opposition to abortion and
dissuade women approaching the clinics from having an abortion against
the privacy rights of the women and the operational rights of the
clinics. 3 06 The Court has found that certain restrictions satisfy the
requirement of a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction while
others do not. Specifically, the Court held unconstitutional an injunction
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from attempting to counsel women
entering abortion clinics who indicated that they did not wish to be
counseled.3 07 Yet in the same case, the Court upheld "fixed buffer zones"
around clinic entrances and driveways to ensure access.308 In another
case, the Court again upheld a provision of an injunction establishing a
buffer zone around an abortion clinic, but held unconstitutional those
provisions prohibiting anti-abortion protestors from making uninvited
approaches and displaying "observable images of aborted fetuses and the
like."3 09 In Hill v. Colorado,310 the Court finally upheld a state law
prohibiting anti-abortion protestors within one hundred feet of the
abortion clinic from coming within eight feet of a person going to the
clinic, without that person's consent, in an effort to dissuade her from
having an abortion.3 11
There is no First Amendment requirement that the government
permit concerted expression in the form of demonstrations or parades to
take place in a public forum, such as the public streets or parks.312
However, if the government chooses to permit concerted expression to
take place in a public forum, as, for example, by opening up the public
streets for parades, the First Amendment comes into play and imposes
significant limits on how the government can regulate access to a public
Nev. Comm'n on Ethics v. Corrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2346-47 (2011) (upholding as a
reasonable time, place, and manner restriction a state ethics law requiring public officials
to recuse themselves from voting on, or advocating the passage or failure of, a matter in
which the official had a conflict of interest).
305. See infra notes 307-11.
306. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15 (2000).
307. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377-80 (1997).
308. Id. at 380-85.
309. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768-70, 773-76 (1994).
310. 530 U.S. 703.
311. Id. at707-14.
312. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 318-23 (2002).
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313forum for purposes of concerted expression. Most fundamental in this
regard is the principle of content neutrality. The government cannot
distinguish between different kinds of concerted expression based on the
content of that expression.314 If, for example, the government sponsors or
allows a private group to hold a parade celebrating a national holiday, it
has thereby opened up the public streets for concerted expression, and it
must allow other groups to use the public streets for other parades or
demonstrations, such as one to protest government policy.
Any parade permit law, therefore, must be content-neutral and must
satisfy the requirements of a reasonable time, place, and manner
regulation. 3 15 The Court has emphasized that such a law must not give
the governmental officials enforcing it any discretion to deny the permit
based on the content of the expression, and so
it must contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards"
controlling the discretion of the licensing official.316 If the
[parade permit] law fails to contain such standards, it is
invalidated "on its face," and a party seeking to hold a parade is
not required to apply for a permit in order to challenge the law's
constitutionality. 3 17 The government may impose a reasonable
licensing fee to cover the costs of the licensing system, but it
may not charge "controversial" speakers for the costs of police
protection.
313. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. Ill, 111-13 (1969) (overturning
disorderly conduct convictions of peaceful protesters who refused to curtail a lawful
street demonstration when onlookers became disorderly).
314. See discussion supra Part III.C.I.
315. Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992).
316. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-59, 776
(1988), in which the Court applied this principle to invalidate a municipal permit law
regulating the placement of newsracks on public property. It was irrelevant in this regard
that the city could ban newsracks on public property, because the city had established a
procedure for allowing some newsracks on public property. Id.
317. See, e.g., id. at 757-60; Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-
51 (1969). As the above discussion indicates, the constitutional requirements for
licensing expression that involves access to public property are the same as the
requirements for licensing expression generally. See supra note 242 and accompanying
text. See also Thomas, 534 U.S. at 318-24 (upholding a municipal parade permit law
requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large scale events in public
parks, because the law contained neutral standards, required applications to be processed
within fourteen days, required an explanation for denial, and provided for administrative
and judicial review).
318. Sedler, supra note 34, at 320 (citing Forsyth Cnty., 505 U.S. at 130-37). The First
Amendment requires that the government protect the rights of controversial speakers
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In practice, most public property has not been designated as a public
forum, so that except for the traditional public forums of the public
streets and parks,'319 most public property constitutes a non-public forum
for purposes of the public forum doctrine.
This means, as stated previously, that the constitutional
permissibility of any restrictions on access to, or use of, such
public property for expressive purposes is determined under a
general "reasonableness" test, which recognizes the
government's entitlement to "reserve the property for its
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise." Thus, the
government may impose category-type restrictions on access to
the non-public forum, so long as they are reasonably related to
the purpose for which the property is being used.3 20 Applying
this standard, the Court has held that a school district may limit
access to the interschool mail system to the exclusive bargaining
representative of its teachers,3 2' that the military may exclude all
322partisan political activity from military bases, and that the
federal government may exclude legal defense and political
advocacy groups from a charity drive aimed at federal
employees and conducted in a federal workplace during working
hours under governmental regulation[,] 3 23 [and that a state-
owned public television network may limit a television debate
against interference from a hostile crowd. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 235-38 (1963).
319. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
320. Id. at 46.
321. Id. at 44-47.
322. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
The reasonableness of this category-type restriction relates to the fact that the
United States has had a long tradition of a politically-neutral military
establishment. This being so, the military could properly exclude partisan
political activity from the base, although it allowed other activity, such as
charitable solicitation, to take place there. Note again, however, that the
government must maintain strict viewpoint neutrality regarding access to the
non-public forum. If, for example,. the military allowed the President to speak
on a military base during a political campaign, it could not refuse to allow a
speech by a candidate of the opposite party.
Sedler, supra note 34, at 320 n.704.
323. Sedler, supra note 34, at 320-21 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-802 (1985) (finding the exclusion reasonable because it
advanced governmental interests in avoiding the appearance of political favoritism,
avoiding controversy, and maximizing support of agencies that provide direct aid to the
poor)).
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among candidates for a Congressional seat to the two major
party candidates and exclude an independent candidate with little
popular support.] 32 4
In addition to imposing category-type restrictions on access
to certain kinds of public property, the government, in an effort
to "reserve the property for its intended purposes," may prohibit
any expressive activity that is "basically incompatible with the
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time."325
Under this test, except for permissible category-type restrictions
on access, the government may not declare the non-public forum
"off-limits" for expression, but may only impose reasonable
restrictions related to preventing interference with the "normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time." For example,
the government could prohibit making a speech in the reading
room of a public library, but it could not prohibit a silent vigil
where persons sat on the floor of the reading room to protest the
library's policies. 32 6 Likewise, the government can prohibit a
demonstration on the grounds of a school while the school is in
session, but not after the school day has ended.327 The Court has
also held that the government may prohibit the posting of signs
on public property[,] such as utility poles and lamp posts, in
order to prevent "visual clutter,"328 that the United States Postal
Service may prohibit the deposit of unstamped materials in a
324. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 669, 676, 682-83 (1998)
(finding the decision to exclude an independent candidate reasonable and a viewpoint-
neutral exercise of journalistic discretion consistent with the First Amendment "where the
decision resulted from lack of viability of the third party candidate").
325. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
326. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139-43 (1966) (reversing convictions of
breaching the peace arising from a silent "sit-in" at a public library to protest its policy of
racial segregation). In United States v. American Library Association, Inc., 539 U.S. 194,
205-06 (2003), the Court specifically held that a public library was not a designated
public forum. The plurality opinion emphasized that the acquisition of Internet terminals
did not make the library a public forum, stating that to create a public forum, "the
government must make an affirmative choice to open up its property for use as a public
forum." Id. at 206. A Court majority in that case upheld on its face a provision of the
Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), requiring public libraries receiving federal
assistance to install software filters to block obscene or child pornographic images and to-
"prevent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to them." Id. at 199
(citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(1) (West 2010)). The law permitted disabling the filters for
"other lawful purposes," and the filter programs at issue permitted disabling during use
by an adult. Id. at 201 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134(f)(3) (West 2006)).
327. See Grayned, 408 U.S. 116-21.
328. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-09 (1984).
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Postal Service-approved letter box, 3 29 and that the military may
generally prohibit protest activity at military bases.3 30
As a practical matter, where the non-public forum is "physically
open," such as an airport terminal, the Court's "reasonableness" test
application does not differ significantly from its application of the
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation doctrine.33 Therefore,
despite the Court's finding that airport terminals are not public forums, it
has held invalid an absolute ban on "all First Amendment activities" at a
terminal.332 The Court has also held unconstitutional a ban on
distributing literature in an airport terminal, while upholding a ban on the
solicitation and receipt of funds in the terminal.3 33
We see from our discussion of the public forum doctrine that there
has been a great deal of litigation over governmental regulation of
expression that takes place on or seeks access to public property. While
the First Amendment applies to determine the constitutionality of such
329. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 116, 119-
32 (1981). The ban on depositing unstamped "mailable matter" in Postal Service-
approved letterboxes aimed to ensure that only pre-paid postage material was deposited
in letterboxes.
330. Sedler, supra note 34, at 321-22 (citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675,
677-85 (1985)).
331. See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574
(1987).
332. See id. at 570-77.
333. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680-85 (1992).
"[Flour Justices took the position that the interior area of an airport terminal was a public
forum for purposes of the public forum doctrine." Sedler, supra note 34, at 322 n.715
(citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 709-16 (Souter, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part)). In addition, these four justices stated that neither the ban on
distribution nor the ban on "solicitation and receipt of funds" could be sustained as a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. Id. A fifth justice, "whose vote provided a
majority on all the issues in the case, took the position that the interior area of an airport
terminal did not constitute a public forum." Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 685 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Applying the general
"reasonableness" test, they concluded that the ban on distribution was not reasonable, but
that the ban on "solicitation and receipt of funds" was reasonable and so could be upheld.
Id. (citing Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 685). In light of current
security regulations under which only ticketed passengers can go to the gates, an airport
terminal provides only a limited opportunity for First Amendment activity. Id. See also
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), in which the Court upheld the Postal
Service's ban of solicitation on postal premises as applied to a sidewalk near the entrance
of a postal building. Four justices took the position that the postal sidewalk was not a
public forum and that the ban on solicitation could be sustained under the general
"reasonableness" test. Id. at 725. A fifth justice took the position that the postal sidewalk
was a public forum, but concluded that the ban on solicitation there could be sustained as
a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. Sedler, supra note 34, at 737-39.
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regulation, it is here, more so than in any other area, that the
governmental regulation at issue is more likely to be upheld against a
First Amendment challenge. We have seen that at least some regulations
of access to a public forum, assuming that they are content-neutral, have
been upheld as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. When it
comes to a non-public forum, which is most public property, a general
reasonableness test applies, under which the government may "reserve
the property for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise," and
so may even impose some category restrictions.334 Nonetheless, any
governmental regulation of "expression that takes place on or seeks
access to public property" comes within the scope of First Amendment
protection, and the public forum doctrine determines whether the
particular regulation of expression will be upheld.335
E. Precedents in Particular Areas of First Amendment Activity
When the result in a First Amendment case is not controlled by the
application of a principle or specific doctrine, it is most likely controlled
by the application of a particular First Amendment Court precedent. As a
practical matter, in any First Amendment case, as in any other
constitutional case, lawyers and judges, including Supreme Court
Justices, will begin their analysis by looking to the applicable precedents
in the particular area of First Amendment activity. In many cases, the
applicable precedents will involve the Court's applications of the First
Amendment principles and doctrines. 33 6 Therefore, when we refer to the
precedents in particular areas of First Amendment activity, we are
referring analytically to precedents that did not involve, at least directly,
the Court's application of principles and doctrines. Nonetheless, in our
discussion of the precedents in particular areas of First Amendment
activity, in an effort to review these precedents as they appear to lawyers
and judges, we will include some cases in which the result, at least in
part, depended on the Court's application of principles and doctrines. We
will now review the Court's precedents in the more important areas of
First Amendment activity.
334. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 815 (1984).
335. Sedler, supra note 34, at 322.
336. See Sedler, supra note 1, at 461 (labeling this derivative approach as "applying
'subsidiary doctrine"' and listing areas of law where this approach is common).
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1. Restrictions on Expression Relating to the Administration of
Justice
The Court has generally rejected governmental efforts to justify
restrictions on freedom of expression on the ground that they are
necessary to promote the fair and efficient administration of justice or to
protect the privacy interests of persons involved in legal proceedings.
The Court has sometimes invoked the narrow specificity principle to find
that the particular challenged restriction is broader than necessary to
advance the asserted "fairness and efficiency" or "protection of privacy"
interest. Other times, it has found the asserted governmental interest
insufficient to justify the restriction on expression in the circumstances
presented. In any event, the Court has held unconstitutional the following
restrictions on expression relating to the administration of justice: an
absolute ban on witnesses' disclosing their testimony before a grand jury
after the grand jury's term has been completed; 3 37 a state law prohibiting
the publishing or broadcasting of the name of a sexual offense victim, as
applied to a newspaper that obtained the name from an inadvertently
released police report;338 a law prohibiting newspapers from publishing
the name of a youth charged as a juvenile offender, as applied to
information that the newspaper lawfully obtained from private sources;339
a law prohibiting the publication of information in confidential legal
proceedings, as applied to a non-participant who had lawfully obtained
the information;340 a law imposing liability for public dissemination of
the name of a rape victim when the name had been obtained from public
court documents; 34 1 and an order prohibiting the press from publishing
the name or picture of an eleven-year-old boy accused of murder, when
the reporter had been lawfully present at a public court hearing and had
photographed the boy en route from the courthouse.34 2 A court, however,
can prohibit lawyers and parties from making public statements about
pending legal proceedings when the statements could create a
"substantial likelihood of material prejudice" in the case.34 3
337. See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 626 (1990).
338. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989).
339. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 98-104 (1979).
340. See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831-34 (1978).
341. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471-76 (1975).
342. See Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 308-12 (1977).
343. Sedler, supra note 34, at 301-02 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S.
1030, 1075-76 (1991)).
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2. Campaign Financing Regulation
In the leading case of Buckley v. Valeo,344 the Court held that money
is speech, such that the expenditure of funds in support of political
candidates and public issues involves freedom of expression for First
Amendment purposes. This being so, the First Amendment imposes
significant constraints on governmental campaign financing
regulation.345 However, beginning with Buckley, the Court has drawn a
sharp distinction between restrictions on contributions and restrictions on
expenditures. 34 6 The Court has generally upheld as constitutional
restrictions on contributions to political candidates on the ground that
unregulated contributions can lead to political corruption and that
contributions do not involve "direct speech" by the contributor.347 Thus,
in Buckley, the Court upheld all the limitations on campaign
contributions to a candidate for federal office contained in the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 .348 The Court has also held that
limitations on candidate contributions are constitutional, even though
those limitations were lower in current dollar value than those upheld in
Buckley. 34 9 The only time that the Court found a limitation on
contributions unconstitutional was when the state-imposed limitation was
slightly more than 1/20th of the limitation on contributions to candidates
for federal office that was upheld in Buckley, and that was the lowest per
election limit in the nation.350
However, it has been a very different story when it comes to
limitations on expenditures by candidates or their supporters. In Buckley,
the Court held unconstitutional all limitations on individual and
344. 424 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976).
345. See id. See also discussion infra pp. 1069-73.
346. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20.
347. Id. at 20-21.
A limitation [on] the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or
campaign organization . . . involves little direct restraint on his political
communication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss
candidates and issues. While contributions may result in political expression if spent
by a candidate or an association to present views to the voters, the transformation of
contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the
contributor.
Id.
348. Id. at 34-38 (upholding contribution amendments to Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1974), including a $1000 limitation on
contributions to a candidate).
349. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 395-97 (2000).
350. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 248-53 (2006).
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candidate expenditures. 35 1 These included a $1000 per year limitation on
an individual expenditure in support of a candidate, limitations on
personal expenditures by candidates on their own behalf, and limitations
on overall campaign expenditures by candidates seeking election to
federal office.3 52 With respect to limiting expenditures by candidates, the
Court specifically rejected the government's asserted justification of
"equalizing the financial resources of candidates" seeking election to
federal office. 35 3
In the same vein, the Court has held unconstitutional the so-called
"Millionaires' Amendment" under which Congress increased the
contribution limits for a non-self-financing candidate whose self-
financing opponent had achieved a specified advantage in spending by
virtue of the opponent's personal funds.354 In addition, the Court recently
struck down a state campaign financing scheme under which candidates
who accepted public financing in exchange for foregoing private
contributions were given additional public funds matching virtually
dollar for dollar the amounts that their opponents and independent
supporters spent beyond the public financing cap.
The Court has also held unconstitutional a limitation on independent
expenditures made by political parties,356 but it has held that it is
constitutionally permissible to limit the expenditures of a political party
that were coordinated with the campaign of the party's candidate.357
351. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51-58.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 54, 56. In rejecting this justification, the Court stated as follows:
The interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates competing for
federal office is no more convincing a justification for restricting the scope of
federal election campaigns. Given the limitation on the size of outside
contributions, the financial resources available to a candidate's campaign, like
the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size and
intensity of the candidate's support. There is nothing invidious, improper, or
unhealthy in permitting such funds to be spent to carry the candidate's message
to the electorate. Moreover, the equalization of permissible campaign
expenditures might serve not to equalize the opportunities of all candidates, but
to handicap a candidate who lacked substantial name recognition or exposure
of his views before the start of the campaign.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
354. See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 736-44 (2010) (invalidating 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a-I
(West 2002)).
355. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2813-18 (2011).
356. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. V. FEC (Colorado Republican 1), 518
U.S. 604, 608-18 (1996).
357. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 533
U.S. 431, 437 (2001).
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In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 (BCRA),358  which amended and supplemented the federal
campaign financing law that had been in effect for the preceding thirty
years.3 59 Among other provisions, the BCRA prohibits corporations and
labor unions from making expenditures for any "electioneering
communication" within sixty days before a general election or thirty days
before a primary election;360 imposes limitations on so-called "soft
money" contributions by corporations and labor unions to political
parties; 36 1 prohibits all contributions by persons under the age of
eighteen; requires disclosures by persons who expend more than $10,000
in any year for "electioneering communications"; 3 62 limits the source and
amount of disbursements that are "coordinated" with a federal candidate
or a national, state, or local party committee; and severely restricts any
national, state, or local political party committee from soliciting,
receiving, or transferring "soft money" funds that are not subject to
federal regulation but are subject to state regulation. When the
constitutionality of BCRA came before the Supreme Court in McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission,363 the Court was sharply divided on the
different constitutional issues presented by the law, but a Court majority
held that all the provisions, except for the ban on contributions by
persons under eighteen years of age, did not violate the First
Amendment.364 The recurring theme in the different opinions upholding
the constitutionality of these provisions was that the governmental
interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption of federal candidates
was sufficiently important to justify limits on political contributions-
and efforts to circumvent those limits-and limits on independent
expenditures by corporations and labor unions from corporate and union
funds.365
358. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
359. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-42 (West 2012) (enacted Feb. 7, 1972).
360. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (West 2010), invalidated by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
361. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441(i) (West 2010), invalidated by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
362. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f) (West 2010).
363. 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 120-22, 142-56, 167-69, 182, 196. The ban on independent expenditures by
corporations and unions from corporate and union funds was of long standing and was
upheld against First Amendment challenge in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990). However, in Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,
551 U.S. 449, 491-500 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring), three justices argued to overrule
the part of the McConnell decision upholding the ban. Two others held that the ban only
applied to "electioneering communications" that were "susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. at
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However, in the later and highly controversial case of Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,366 a sharply divided Court held
that the First Amendment protected the right of corporations and labor
unions to use corporate and union funds to make expenditures on behalf
of political candidates. This being so, the Court overruled that part of the
McConnell decision, upholding the ban on using corporate and union
funds for any "electioneering communication" within sixty days before a
general election or thirty days before a primary election.3 67 The effect of
this part of Citizens United is that corporations or unions can use their
general funds without restraint to make independent expenditures on
behalf of political candidates. 36 8 In Citizens United, the Court specifically
upheld the disclosure and disclaimer and the non-coordination provisions
of the BCRA as applied to corporations and labor unions, and it did not
question the constitutionality of the bans on the use of general funds to
make direct contributions to candidates and political parties.369
Therefore, under the present state of the law, the government can
prohibit corporations and labor unions from using their general funds to
make direct contributions on behalf of candidates and political parties,
but it cannot prohibit them from using their general funds to make
independent expenditures on behalf of candidates and political parties.
470-76. The Court had previously held that it was unconstitutional to prohibit a non-
profit corporation from expending its general funds in connection with an election for
public office, FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986), and to bar a
corporation from expending corporate funds to influence a voter referendum on a
proposed progressive income tax on corporations. First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 767-69 (1978).
366. 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010).
367. Id. It also specifically overruled Austin, 494 U.S. 652.
368. It will no longer be necessary for corporations and labor unions to solicit persons
to contribute to corporate or union-sponsored political action committees. In Am.
Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012), the Court, in a per curiam
opinion, applied Citizens United to summarily reverse a decision of the Montana
Supreme Court that upheld a state law prohibiting corporations from making
expenditures in support of a political candidate or political party. Dissenting from that
action, Justice Breyer, in an opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
contended that the Court should grant certiorari to reconsider Citizens United in light of
the Montana Supreme Court's finding that independent expenditures by corporations in
Montana did in fact lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana. But
the dissenting justices did not see a "significant possibility of reconsideration" in light of
the Court's per curiam disposition of the case, so they voted instead to deny the petition
for certiorari. Id. at 2492 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
369. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-72. In Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539
U.S. 146, 149 (2003), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the ban on using corporate
funds for political contributions, even as applied to contributions by a non-profit
advocacy corporation.
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The government, however, can apply disclosure and disclaimer and non-
coordination requirements to those expenditures.
A number of states allow their citizens to enact laws directly through
initiatives placed on the election ballot.37 0 To get an initiative proposal on
the ballot, the proponents must gather a specified number of signatures of
registered voters, 37 1 and they often pay persons to circulate the petitions
and obtain signatures. State efforts to prohibit or restrict the use of paid
circulators have been held to violate the First Amendment. 372
3. Governmental Broadcast, Cable, and Internet Regulation
Governmental regulation of broadcasting in the United
States has traditionally taken place in connection with the
allocation of radio and television frequencies by the Federal
Communications Commission. The Supreme Court has held that
such regulation can proceed on [the assumption] of ["]public
ownership of the airwaves,["] and that the Federal
Communications Commission can require that broadcasters
operate "in the public interest." This being so, the Court has
upheld against First Amendment challenge the Federal
Communication Commission's now-repealed "fairness
doctrine," which required that broadcasters provide for a
balanced presentation of viewpoints, allocate a reasonable
percentage of broadcast time for the discussion of public issues,
and in certain circumstances allow other persons to have access
to broadcasting facilities in order to respond to positions taken
by the broadcasters.373 The Court has also held that Congress
370. See State-by-State List of Initiative and Referendum Provisions, INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/statewide-i%26r.htm (last visited Mar.
30, 2013).
371. See id.
372. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415-16 (1988) (invalidating a Colorado law
making it a felony to compensate petition circulators); Buckley v. Am. Law Found., 525
U.S. 182, 186-87 (1999) (invalidating requirements that ballot initiative circulators be
registered voters, "that they wear an identification badge bearing the circulator's name,"
and that initiative proponents "report the names and addresses of all paid circulators and
the amount paid to each circulator").
373. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391-96 (1969). "The government's
imposition of such a requirement on newspapers would be unconstitutional because of the
chilling effect it could have on the newspapers' discussion of public issues." Sedler,
supra note 34, at 308 n.639 (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1969)). While the imposition of this requirement could have the same chilling effect on
the discussion of public issues by broadcasters, the Court has found that this possible
chilling effect was justified because of the "public interest" considerations that followed
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may constitutionally provide that candidates for federal office
have a legally enforceable right to purchase a reasonable amount
of broadcast time.374 Finally, the Federal Communications
Commission may impose certain limited restrictions on
programming that might be [objectionable] to children during the
time of the day when children are likely to be viewing or
listening.375 Nonetheless, the First Amendment does apply to
governmental regulation of broadcasting, and certain
broadcasting regulations may be found to violate the First
Amendment, such as a complete ban on editorializing by public
broadcasting stations that receive grants from the federal
government.376
from the allocation of scarce radio and television frequencies to the broadcasters. See Red
Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01. In repealing the "fairness doctrine" in 1987, the Federal
Communications Commission took the position that there had been a marked increase in
the availability of information services to the public since Red Lion-most particularly,
the advent of cable television-and that enforcement of the "fairness doctrine" was no
longer in the public interest. See Sedler, supra note 34, at 309 n.639 (citing Gen. Fairness
Obligations of Broad. Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 142, 221, 246-47 (1985); Syracuse Peace
Council, 2 FCC Red. 5043, 5056-57 (1987)).
374. Compare CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 371-97 (1981), with CBS, Inc. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 97-132 (1973). There,
the television network had refused to accept any public issue advertising.
Parties seeking to purchase such advertising challenged the ban, and the
Supreme Court held that there was no First Amendment requirement that the
network accept such advertising." While the television network was not a state
actor for constitutional purposes, the . . . [contention was] that the First
Amendment imposed [the] obligation on the Federal Communications
Commission to make the airwaves open for such advertising. The contrary
contention was that for the Federal Communications Commission to make the
networks accept such advertising would itself violate the networks' First
Amendment rights.
Sedler, supra note 34, at 309 n.640. While the Court's decision did not rest on the latter
ground, it was a consideration in the Court's determination "that the First Amendment
did not impose the obligation on the Federal Communications Commission to require
broadcasters to accept public issue advertising." Sedler, supra note 34, at 309 n.640
(citing Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 121-22).
375. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-51 (1978) (broadcaster's use
of "seven dirty words"). In Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2315-20 (2012), the Court dealt with a ban on "fleeting
expletives and momentary nudity." Without deciding whether the ban violated the First
Amendment rights of the broadcasters, the Court held that the Commission failed to give
the broadcasters fair notice that the "fleeting expletives and momentary nudity could be
found" to be "actionably indecent," so that the Commission's standards as applied to
those broadcasts were unconstitutionally vague, and its order was set aside. Id. at 2319-
20.
376. Sedler, supra note 34, at 309-10. Compare FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468
U.S. 364, 366-73 (1984) with Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
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"The advent of cable television and its regulation by the federal
government and local municipalities has given rise to a number of First
Amendment questions that cannot be fitted neatly into the doctrine that
the Court has developed to deal with broadcast regulation."3 7 With
conventional cablecasting, an operator obtains an effective monopoly by
placing cable wires under or on municipally owned streets and utility
poles, 37 8 and then "municipalities generally enter into a franchise
agreement with a particular cable operator to serve the city[.] . . . These
franchise agreements typically require the cable operator to reserve some
channels for public, educational and governmental access" ("public
access channels" or "pegs"). 37 9
"Congress was concerned about the monopolistic character of
cablecasting in most municipalities" and imposed extensive regulations
on the cable industry in the Cable Television and Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992,380 and again in some provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.381 One of these regulations
required cable operators to devote a portion of their channels to
carrying the programs of local broadcasters.382 A sharply divided
Court upheld the constitutionality of these "must-carry"
provisions.383 [While] [f]ederal law generally prevents cable
operators from exercising any editorial control over the content
of leased-access or public-access channels[,] [in 1992] . . .
Congress permitted cable operators to prohibit the broadcast of
material that the cable operator "reasonably believes describes or
669, 676, 682-83 (1998) (holding that a state-owned public television broadcaster
sponsoring a public debate could exclude from that debate an independent candidate
having little public support).
377. See Sedler, supra note 34, at 310.
378. See id.
379. Id.
380. Id. (citing Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460).
381. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 521-573 (West 2012).
382. See 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 522(a), 534-35 (West 2012).
383. Sedler, supra note 34, at 310 n.644 (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180, 185, 195, 211-16 (1997) (plurality opinion) (finding it appropriate to defer to
Congress where it had "drawn reasonable inferences based upon substantial evidence"
and narrowly tailored the law to preserve the benefits of local broadcast television,
promote widespread dissemination from multiple sources, and promote fair
competition.)) "The dissenting Justices contended that the record in the case did not
support the conclusion that cable television posed a significant threat to local broadcast
markets or that the law was narrowly tailored to deal with anti-competitive conduct."
Turner, 520 U.S. at 195. See id. at 230-33 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently
offensive manner" on leased-access and public-access
channels. 38
The Act further provided that if the cable operator did not
prohibit such material from being broadcast on leased access
channels, the cable operator was required to provide a separate
channel for the material, to scramble or otherwise block its
presentation, and to permit viewing only upon written request of
the subscriber. Congress also imposed these "segregate and
block" requirements for channels primarily dedicated to sexual
programming and required cable operators to honor a
subscriber's request to block any undesired programs. The Court,
again sharply divided, upheld against First Amendment
challenge the provision giving cable operators the authority to
prohibit the broadcast of [patently] offensive material, but held
unconstitutional [all] segregate and block requirements.385
There is much concern in the United States today about protecting
minors from harmful material on the Internet. In response to this
concern, Congress enacted a law that prohibited the "transmission of
obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age" and
the "knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a
manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age." 386 The Court,
this time with little dissent, invalidated both provisions as being too
vague and overbroad to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 387
384. 47 U.S.C.A. § 532(h) (West 2012).
385. Sedler, supra note 34, at 310 n.647 (citing Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1996)). The Court majority took the
position that the "block and segregate" requirements did not "properly accommodate the
speech restrictions they impose and the legitimate objective they seek to attain." Id. at
755.
386. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (citing Communications Decency Act
of 1996,47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii), (d)(1) (West 1996)).
387. Id. at 870-79. A major problem with this kind of legislation is that it could
suppress the dissemination of sexually-oriented material to adults, as existing technology
does not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining
access to its internet communications without also denying access to adults. See id. See
also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666-67 (2004) (indicating that efforts to regulate
the Internet dissemination of sexually-oriented materials to minors would probably
violate the First Amendment, since filtering software could be used to block such
material at the receiving end); United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 806-
19 (2000) (invalidating "blocking" restrictions on cable channels that were primarily
transmitting sexually-oriented programming, emphasizing that less restrictive means,
such as the use of a technological solution that was available to parents who chose to
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However, the Court has held that when Congress provides assistance to
public libraries for internet access, it can impose as a condition a
requirement that libraries install filtering software that blocks access to
visual depictions that constitute "obscenity or pornography" and visual
depictions that are "harmful to minors."38 8 The law was held not to
violate the First Amendment because it permitted the libraries to disable
the filter at the request of an adult patron and to disable it for use by
minors for "bona fide research or other lawful purposes."
4. Government Employment and Contracting
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies to
actions taken by the government in its capacity as employer and
contractor.39 0 The general principle in determining the First Amendment
rights of government employees and contractors is that there must be a
balance between the interest of the employee or contractor as a citizen in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
government in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees and contractors. 3 9 1 Applying this principle, the
Court has held that the government violated the First Amendment rights
of a teacher by terminating a teacher for sending a letter to a newspaper
that was critical of the way that the school board had handled past
proposals to raise new revenues for the schools;3 92 by terminating a lower
level employee who had expressed to another employee, in private
conversation, the hope that the President would be assassinated; 3 93 and
by terminating or preventing the renewal of a contractor's trash hauling
contract with a county because of his criticism of the county board of
commissioners.3 94 On the other hand, when an employee took what the
governmental employer considered to be inappropriate action to protest a
personal office grievance, her discharge for doing so did not violate the
employee's First Amendment rights. 39 5 The First Amendment also does
implement it, were available to protect minors from exposure to sexually-oriented
materials).
388. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 198-99 (2003).
389. Id.
390. Id. at 208-09.
391. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968).
392. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75.
393. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 378, 379-81 (1987).
394. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'ns, Wabaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 670-73
(1996).
395. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140-41, 154 (1983). In this case, an assistant
prosecutor objected to her transfer to another court and circulated a memorandum to
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not protect statements made by public employees in the course of their
official duties.396
The government does not violate the First Amendment rights of civil
service employees by prohibiting them from engaging in partisan
political activity.3 97 The Court has held that the government could
conclude that partisan political activity by civil service employees could
interfere with the impartial and efficient operation of the civil service
system.398 The Court also emphasized that the ban on partisan political
activity did not interfere with the ability of civil service employees to
express political views outside of the context of a partisan political
campaign. 39 9 The other side of the coin, so to speak, is that, even in the
absence of a civil service, state and local governments cannot deny
governmental employment on the basis of political party membership.
This being so, the Court has held unconstitutional traditional "political
patronage" practices under which the political party that wins an election
would discharge all employees belonging to the opposite political
party.o The result is that, under the First Amendment, non-
other prosecutors raising questions about employee morale and the prosecutor's
management of the office. Id. at 140-41. Since her speech concerned only a matter of
private concern rather than a matter of public interest, the First Amendment did not
protect her activity. Id. at 154. The government employer must perform a reasonable
investigation to determine an employee's actual speech and must in good faith believe the
facts on which it purports to act before it can discharge an employee for unprotected
speech. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 677 (1994). The requirement that the
employee's speech must be a matter of public concern applied to a claim that the
government violated the employee's rights under the petition clause of the First
Amendment by retaliating against the employee for winning reinstatement in a union
grievance proceeding. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491 (2011).
396. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). In this case, a supervising
prosecuting attorney wrote a disposition memorandum in which he recommended
dismissal of a case on the ground that the affidavit in support of a search warrant
contained false representations. Id. at 420. He contended that as a result of the
memorandum, he was transferred to a less desirable work location and denied a
promotion in retaliation. Id. at 415. The Court held that since he wrote the memorandum
pursuant to his official duties as a supervising prosecuting attorney, he was not speaking
as a citizen and so could not claim the protections of the First Amendment. Id. at 421. See
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and Section 1983:
A Critique of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008), for a discussion of
this case in relation to the precedents in this area of First Amendment activity.
397. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 578
(1973).
398. Id. at 565.
399. Id. at 575; Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 602 (1973). In United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995), the Court held that a
broad ban on civil service employees below grade GS-16 receiving honoraria for making
an appearance or speech or writing an article violated their First Amendment rights.
400 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976).
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policymaking and non-confidential state and local government
employees cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that they were not
affiliated with or sponsored by the political party in power.40 Hiring,
promotion, transfer, and recall decisions in governmental employment
cannot be made on this basis. 40 2 For the same reason, a city could not
constitutionally deny governmental contracts to independent contractors
who had supported the incumbent mayor's opponent in the last
election.4 3
5. Expression in Special Environments
While the First Amendment clearly applies to expression that takes
place in special environments, such as public schools, prisons, and
military areas, the Court has recognized that the government has a
legitimate interest in regulating expression in these environments
precisely because of the special function that they are established to
perform. Thus, the Court has been disposed to uphold restrictions on
expression in the school environment that can be shown to be related to
valid educational objectives, restrictions in the prison environment that
can be shown to be related to prison discipline, and restrictions in the
military environment that can be shown to be related to efficient military
operation.
In the public school environment, the Court has held that a school
may discipline a student for delivering a school assembly speech that
contained sexual innuendos, emphasizing the broad authority of school
officials to prohibit "inappropriate" student speech at a school
assembly.'o In a similar vein, the Court has held that a school may
discipline a student for displaying a banner at a school-sponsored event
that was "reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use."4 5
The Court has also held that where the publication of a school
newspaper was part of a regular course for which academic
credit was given, the faculty advisor could exercise editorial
control over the content of the student work that would be
published in the newspaper.'0 However, the Court held that a
public school could not, consistent with the First Amendment,
401. Id.
402. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1990).
403. O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 722-23 (1996).
404. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
405. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403, 404-418 (2007).
406. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).
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prohibit a student from wearing a black armband to school to
protest the Vietnam War.40 7
In the prison context, the Court has held that the First
Amendment permits the prison authorities to exercise extensive
control over prisoner correspondence and over the publications
that the prisoners may receive from the outside.o The test is
whether the regulation is "reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests," [and,] [a]pplying this test, the Court has
held that [the] prison authorities may exclude incoming
publications found to be "detrimental to security, good order, or
discipline of the institution," [or that] "might facilitate criminal
activity."a [The] prison authorities have less discretion to
regulate outgoing correspondence, which does not pose the same
kind of danger to prison security[,] [and] the Court has held
unconstitutional prison regulations that prohibited outgoing
correspondence that "unduly complained" of prison conditions
or "expressed inflammatory . . . views or beliefs."410 However,
precisely because prisoners may communicate with the media by
mail, they cannot claim a First Amendment right to face-to-face
411interviews with the media in prison.
The First Amendment rights of persons in military service
are subject to the exigencies of efficient military operation, and
can be severely restricted while the persons are on base or in
military uniform. The Court, for example, has upheld a military
regulation prohibiting a serviceperson while on base, in uniform,
or in a foreign country[] from soliciting signatures on a petition
or distributing material on base without authorization from the
407. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969). See also
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 855 (1982) (indicating that the First Amendment may
impose some limitations on the power of school authorities to remove "objectionable"
books from a public school library).
408. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
409. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404-05 (1989). "The Court has also upheld a
regulation that, in effect, prohibited inmates from writing to non-relative inmates at other
institutions." Sedler, supra note 34, at 312 n.653 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)). In
addition, the Court has upheld "a ban on the receipt of hardcover books (which could be
used to smuggle in contraband) unless mailed directly from the publisher, a bookstore or
a book club." Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)). Further, the Court has
held that an inmate does not have a "First Amendment right to provide legal assistance to
fellow inmates." Id. (citing Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001)).
410. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 399 (1974).
411. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28 (1974).
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post commander. Permission could be denied if the commander
determined that the solicitation or distribution would result in a
"clear danger to the loyalty, discipline or morale of members of
the Armed Forces, or material interference with the
accomplishment of a military mission."4 12 The Court has also
held that the military may constitutionally punish as "conduct
unbecoming [of] an officer" an officer's urging of black soldiers
to refuse orders to serve in Vietnam.4 13
6. Freedom of Association
The freedom of association protected by the First Amendment
focuses on the right of people to belong to groups and organizations and
to engage in concerted organizational activity. As a general proposition,
the government cannot impose sanctions on people because they belong
to organizations, including organizations advocating illegal conduct.4 14
Likewise, people generally cannot be denied or discriminated against
with respect to governmental employment because of their membership
in particular organizations.4 15
Because the First Amendment protects organizational membership,
the government cannot, in the exercise of its regulatory power over
412. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 350 (1980).
413. Sedler, supra note 34, at 312-13 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 738
(1974)).
414. In Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 233 (1957),
the Court held that a state could not refuse to license a person as a lawyer because of the
person's past membership in the Communist Party. And in United States v. Robel, 389
U.S. 258, 259 (1967), the Court held that the federal government could not deny
employment in defense facilities to members of designated "communist action" groups,
at least in the absence of a showing that the individual was a member of a "subversive"
organization with knowledge of the organization's illegal purpose and a specific intent to
further that illegal purpose. However, in the more recent case of Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2010), the Court held that a federal law making it a
crime to "knowingly provide material support or resources to a 'foreign terrorist
organization' prohibited a group from providing educational programs designed to
persuade such an organization to pursue its aims through peaceful means, and that such
prohibition did not violate the group's freedom of association rights.
415. See supra notes 400-403 and accompanying text. Even in the absence of a civil
service, state and local governments cannot deny governmental employment on the basis
of political party membership, nor can they make hiring, promotion, transfer, and recall
decision on this basis. Sedler, supra note 34, at 323 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party of
Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 62 (1990)). The result has been to put an end to traditional "political
patronage" practices and to ensure that "nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential state and
local government employees cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that they were not
affiliated with or sponsored by the political party in power." Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)).
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organizations, compel an organization to turn over its membership lists
to the government.416 Likewise, since organizations have a protected
First Amendment right to engage in concerted organizational activity, an
organization that sponsors a consumer boycott for the purpose of
achieving political change cannot be held liable in damages for the
economic losses suffered by businesses against which the boycott is
directed. 1  The government cannot, in the guise of regulating the
practice of law, prohibit an organization from soliciting parties to bring
litigation to advance organizational objectives418 or prohibit an
organization from arranging for lawyers to represent the organization's
members in private litigation.419
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association also
restricts governmental efforts to regulate political party primary
elections. Each party must be able to determine who will participate in
the party's primary election, so if a party chooses to open the party
primary to non-party members, the state cannot prevent it from doing so
by requiring that only voters who have declared party membership can
vote in the party primary.4 20
416. NAACP v. Ala. ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
417. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 888 (1982). "In [Claibome], a
civil rights organization had organized a consumer boycott against local businesses for
the purpose of forcing them to put pressure on the local governmental body to accede to
the organization's demands." Selder, supra note 34, at 323 n.720.
418. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 418 (1963).
419. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. Mich. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 577 (1971).
420. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 210 (1986). Nor can the
state prohibit a political party from endorsing candidates in a party primary. Eu v. S.F.
Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216, 222-29 (1989). The state also
violated a political party's First Amendment rights by requiring that the candidates of all
parties run in a "blanket primary" in which voters were permitted to vote for any
candidate despite the candidate's party affiliation, and the candidate of each party who
received the highest number of votes was the party's nominee at the general election. Cal.
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572-82 (2000). However, it is constitutional for
the state to adopt a "blanket primary" system under which each candidate on the ballot
must state a party preference or independent status, and the two candidates with the
highest and second-highest vote totals advance to the general election regardless of their
party preferences. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
452-53 (2008). This system, said the Court, does not choose a party's nominees, but
simply enables the two highest vote-getters to advance to the general election. Id. at 453.
The Court also found that there was "no basis to presume that a well-informed electorate
[would] interpret a candidate's party-preference designation to mean that the candidate
[was] the party's chosen nominee . . . or that the party associates with or approves of the
candidate." Id. at 454. A number of other cases have upheld state laws protecting the
right of political parties to control the nomination of the party's candidates over claims
that these laws violate the associational rights of voters. These include state laws that
prohibit "fusion" candidacies by which a candidate appears on the ballot as a candidate
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
The First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association
cannot be asserted, however, by large private membership
organizations and "private business clubs" to avoid the
application of state anti-discrimination laws to their
discriminatory membership practices that deny membership to
racial minorities and women. The Court has held that because
these organizations are large and are relatively unselective in
their membership, a requirement that they admit racial minorities
and women to membership will not impede the organizations'
ability to carry out their organizational activity or "unduly
burden" the associational interests of their members.42' . . . [T]he
only . . . limitation on the government's power to prohibit
[discrimination] is that it cannot act in such a way that would
destroy the structural integrity of the particular organization and
prevent it from carrying out the purpose for which it was formed,
such as by prohibiting an avowedly religious or ethnic
organization from limiting its membership to persons of that
-422
religious or ethnic group.
IV. A CONCLUDING NOTE
In this writing, we have revisited the "Law of the First
Amendment.",42 3 The "Law of the First Amendment" consists of the
chilling effect concept and the principles, doctrines, and precedents in
different areas of First Amendment activity that have emerged from the
collectivity of the Supreme Court's decisions in First Amendment cases
over a long period of time. In the context of actual litigation, the "Law of
the First Amendment" often controls the results, or at least sets the
for more than one party, Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353
(1997); state laws that enable a political party to invite only its own registered members
and voters registered as independents to vote in its primary, Clingman v. Beaver, 544
U.S. 581, 584 (2005); state laws that prohibit "write-in" voting in primary and general
elections, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992); and a state law authorizing a
political party to nominate judicial candidates by party convention instead of by a
primary election, N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 198 (2008).
421. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 1-3 (1988); Roberts
v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984).
422. Sedler, supra note 34, at 322-24. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,
643 (2000), the Court held that the state could not apply its anti-discrimination law to
require the Boy Scouts of America, a "[non]-profit organization engaged in instilling its
system of values in young people," which included opposition to homosexuality, to
accept homosexuals as members.
423. Sedler, supra note 1.
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parameters for the resolution of the First Amendment question.4 24 Our
review of the Supreme Court's decisions in the twenty-plus years since
the original article was written has demonstrated that nothing has
changed in the intervening years and that the structure of the "Law of the
First Amendment" is exactly the same as it was at the time of the original
article.425
It also cannot be doubted that the "Law of the First Amendment" has
resulted in a very high degree of constitutional protection for freedom of
expression in this Nation. As I have said, "the constitutional protection
afforded to freedom of expression in the United States is seemingly
unparalleled in other constitutional systems, . . . and in the United States,
as a constitutional matter, the value of freedom of expression generally
prevails over other democratic values.A 26
In the view of a number of commentators, we give "too much"
constitutional protection to freedom of speech in the United States,
particularly when it comes to protecting "bad ideas," such as hate
speech,4 27 or when it enables corporations and labor unions to make
unrestricted expenditures of corporate or union funds for political
purposes. 4 28 At the same time, the expansive protection to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment ensures that there will be robust
debate and the widest dissemination of ideas. A few years back, I asked
participants in a Humanities Colloquium to explore the difference
between the constitutional protection of freedom of speech in the United
States and the rest of the world in light of humanistic values.429
Specifically, I asked them to consider "whether humanistic values could
be relied on to justify the strong constitutional protection that we give to
freedom of speech."430 A consensus seemed to emerge, and the
consensus was that in the United States, the strong constitutional
protection for freedom of speech was itself an American humanistic
value, a value that is a product of our own history and experience, and a
value that is reflected in American culture.4 31 It is a part of our culture
that people are "free to speak their mind" and need not fear that they will
424. See supra Part Ill.A.
425. See supra Part 111.
426. See Sedler, supra note 10.
427. See Rosenfeld, supra note 73.
428. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1133
(2011). This article is one of ten articles by law professors commenting on the Citizens
United decision in Symposium: An Intersection of Laws: Citizens United v. FEC, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 887 (2011).
429. See supra note 10.
430. Id. at 378.
431. Id.
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be sanctioned for saying something that is offensive or unpopular. "Thus,
in the United States, a concern for humanistic values would justify
protecting 'bad ideas' and 'harmful speech." 4 32 In the United States, the
government is not permitted to make decisions about what ideas may be
expressed and what ideas may not be expressed. The constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression under the First Amendment then
means freedom of expression in the fullest sense. For better or worse-
and I believe it is for better-this is the American way.
432. See Sedler, supra note 10.
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